Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 14
pro vyhledávání: '"Ninghua Du"'
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 66:315-333
We implement behavioral mechanisms in a natural field experiment to increase loan repayment rates on a peer-to-peer (P2P) lending website. The results show that text message reminders that convey lenders’ positive expectations considerably increase
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::29173c6039a25bd446f9ee3be7807d94
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3216
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3216
Publikováno v:
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 100:101909
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8389843102ddb01d59971d40061bff56
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101909
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2022.101909
Autor:
Ninghua Du, Quazi Shahriar
Publikováno v:
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 77:78-87
This study proposes ex-post cheap-talk evaluations as a potential behavioral force in contract designs. Specifically, in a one shot gift-exchange game between a firm and a worker, we experimentally investigate whether a worker's preference for avoidi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a72e6c8671797eec6d16716baea04fbf
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.09.008
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.09.008
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 99:224-238
Will generous return policies in auctions benefit bidders? We investigate this issue using second-price common-value auctions. Theoretically, we find that the symmetric bidding equilibrium is unique unless returns are free, and when returns are free
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0814d1a05fd88b200d2f8a51440e4d86
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.002
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 128:59-71
We present a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate whether and to what extent people will cheat on behalf of a member of their own in-group at the expense of a non-member. We investigate the impact of social/group identity on cheating by ru
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6da8df004db669e579d2986f5532262c
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.008
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.008
Publikováno v:
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 57:120-133
We experimentally investigate a new variant of the trust/investment game that captures some key features of internet peer-to-peer (P2P) lending: the borrower specifies the amount of money required and makes a contingent promise about the value of the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e42410a2fc3f9ea100e7d29ec05955b5
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.05.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.05.004
Publikováno v:
European Economic Review. 64:194-208
In this paper, we propose a new channel of contract design to boost efficiency. If deviating from one's own words induces a self-imposed moral burden, the optimal contracting procedure with regard to cheap talk shall assign the responsibility for ins
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9c7624637d4bdc8f15ee13a06202520e
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.07.012
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.07.012
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 87:91-100
We provide the first experimental test of the consequences of delegation in a mixed duopoly. Such delegation allows a profit maximizing private owner and a welfare maximizing public owner to weight sales in managerial contracts. Theory predicts that
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f23f8347c4b748fe58329cb2d34e758f
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.01.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.01.006
Autor:
Ninghua Du
Publikováno v:
New Zealand Economic Papers. 43:191-202
Theory (Du, 2008) predicts that equilibrium prices will be lower when firms' advertising conveys the price than when it does not convey the price. In the laboratory sessions, sellers make two decisions: what price to set, and whether to advertise to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::57fa5c48b3d78b5c112a3e2ad906e7de
https://doi.org/10.1080/00779950903005523
https://doi.org/10.1080/00779950903005523