Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 463
pro vyhledávání: '"Nie, Yu Marco"'
Combinatorial bilevel congestion pricing (CBCP), a variant of the discrete network design problem, seeks to minimize the total travel time experienced by all travelers in a road network, by strategically selecting toll locations and determining the c
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2412.06482
As one of the most fundamental concepts in transportation science, Wardrop equilibrium (WE) has always had a relatively weak behavioral underpinning. To strengthen this foundation, one must reckon with bounded rationality in human decision-making pro
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.02500
In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.09734
In a Stackelberg congestion game (SCG), a leader aims to maximize their own gain by anticipating and manipulating the equilibrium state at which the followers settle by playing a congestion game. Often formulated as bilevel programs, large-scale SCGs
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2209.07618
Publikováno v:
In Transportation Research Part B December 2024 190
Publikováno v:
In Transportation Research Part B February 2025 192
Publikováno v:
In Transportation Research Part B October 2024 188
Publikováno v:
In Transportation Research Part A August 2024 186
Publikováno v:
In Transportation Research Part B August 2024 186
Autor:
Liu, Boyi, Li, Jiayang, Yang, Zhuoran, Wai, Hoi-To, Hong, Mingyi, Nie, Yu Marco, Wang, Zhaoran
To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the rewards of
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2110.01212