Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 32
pro vyhledávání: '"Nicholas Unwin"'
Autor:
Nicholas Unwin
Publikováno v:
Biolinguistics, Vol 6, Iss 3-4, Pp 475-490 (2012)
It is often claimed, following Joseph Levine, that there is an ‘explanatory gap’ between ordinary physical facts and the way we perceive things, so that it is impossible to explain, among other things, why colours actually look the way they do. C
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/b47749b415e94944a39af767b1124ff8
Autor:
Nicholas Unwin
Properties and concepts are similar kinds of thing in so far as they are both typically understood to be whatever it is that predicates stand for. However, they are generally supposed to have different identity criteria: for example, heat is the same
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bec2623723bca09a3ee7aba9dfe423e9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00474-0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00474-0
Autor:
Nicholas Unwin
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 197:3375-3394
The question of whether it is permissible to quantify into a modal context is re-examined from an empiricist perspective. Following Wiggins, it is argued that an ontology of continuants implies essentialism, but it is also argued, against Wiggins, th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0daf0bafde5ab9bf33880af07128ccb6
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1891-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1891-8
Autor:
Nicholas Unwin
Publikováno v:
Acta Analytica. 28:257-266
Deflationism is usually thought to differ from the correspondence theory over whether truth is a substantial property. However, I argue that this notion of a ‘substantial property’ is tendentious. I further argue that the Equivalence Schema alone
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::46757048ce0d5af4b25de6d0af337f10
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0174-0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0174-0
Autor:
Nicholas Unwin
Publikováno v:
Philosophy. 86:405-424
A major part of the mind–body problem is to explain why a given set of physical processes should give rise to perceptual qualities of one sort rather than another. Colour hues are the usual example considered here, and there is a lively debate as t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b58528fbcf71f5e26d73acbaf94bdc07
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819111000234
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819111000234
Autor:
Nicholas Unwin
Publikováno v:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 77:659-684
Divine law theories of metaethics claim that moral rightness is grounded in God�s commands, wishes and so forth. Expressivist theories, by contrast, claim that to call something morally right is to express our own attitudes, not to report on G
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::051deca8608ffaf99951a36185db2fd0
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00214.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00214.x
Autor:
alan millar, nicholas unwin
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Books. 46:167-170
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::92f5bae9c1c781b0bf790fecde417921
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.00366.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.00366.x
Autor:
Nicholas Unwin
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Quarterly. 62:876-878
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3369c3e2ba42921916841df89754e26a
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00078.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00078.x
Autor:
Nicholas Unwin
Publikováno v:
South African Journal of Philosophy; Vol 33, No 1 (2014)
It is argued that it is very hard to analyse causation in such a way that prevents everything from causing everything else. This is particularly true if we assume that the causal relation is transitive, for it all too often happens that causal chains
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c67775d5550140571513342c08ef2153
https://www.ajol.info/index.php/sajpem/article/view/101455
https://www.ajol.info/index.php/sajpem/article/view/101455
Autor:
Nicholas Unwin
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Quarterly. 49:337-352
Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted (e.g., conditional and disjunctive) contexts. An essential part of Blac
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2953790201aa64d17912bf455df53ead
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00146
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00146