Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 148
pro vyhledávání: '"Nicholas C. Yannelis"'
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 140:348-362
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e1c927d1d5380ec4033fce287385ba1f
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.006
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory Bulletin. 11:27-44
It is known that the core of an economy with externalities may be empty. We consider two concepts of dominance that allow us to prove that the set formed by individually rational, Pareto optimal allocations is stable and coincides with the core that,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::489cd052912175cafe9e4258f804c97a
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-022-00239-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-022-00239-x
Autor:
Huiyi Guo, Nicholas C. Yannelis
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 132:553-575
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f5126d06897ad83678b3f10a38373ac6
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.022
Autor:
Nicholas C. Yannelis, Konrad Podczeck
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 73:413-420
We extend a result on existence of Walrasian equilibria in He and Yannelis (Econ Theory 61:497–513, 2016) by replacing the compactness assumption on consumption sets made there by the standard assumption that these sets are closed and bounded from
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::acc83028953c3dbe5c77fddd8a1f26a0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01400-6
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01400-6
Autor:
Nicholas C. Yannelis, Zhiwei Liu
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory Bulletin. 10:167-181
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2010a7a371072308085448d9880ee7b0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-021-00206-y
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-021-00206-y
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 73:625-654
This paper investigates the existence of a nondegenerate pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a double auction between one seller and several heterogeneous buyers in the independent private value framework. It begins with three examples describ
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::09a0706eee1c38492780706cb0dc16b9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01372-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01372-7
Autor:
Nicholas C. Yannelis, Zhiwei Liu
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 72:801-833
To justify the use of Wald’s maxmin preferences in an asymmetric information economy, we introduce a mechanism designer who can convince/persuade agents to adopt Wald’s maxmin preferences. We show that more efficient and individually rational all
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bbe1640175853a6b66e0948c57b5cc37
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01364-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01364-7
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 90:1-11
We generalize de Castro and Yannelis (2018) by taking into account the use of randomization. We answer the following questions: Is each efficient allocation of de Castro and Yannelis (2018) still Pareto optimal? Are all efficient allocations still in
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b3b6f9aa20f24f392859cea19e0f2157
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.004
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 22:1481-1514
We introduce externalities into the classical model by Shapley and Scarf; that is, agents care about others and their preferences are defined over allocations rather than over single indivisible goods. After collecting some results about the nonexist
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9bf4519178bba5876ca4a8c9fad03280
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12470
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12470
Autor:
Huiyi Guo, Nicholas C. Yannelis
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 73:565-593
The paper examines notions of incentive compatibility in an environment with ambiguity-averse agents. In particular, we propose the notion of maxmin transfer coalitional incentive compatibility, which is immune to coalitional manipulations and thus m
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f4ae3d6cd0c6773b867497d2521a93eb
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01304-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01304-x