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pro vyhledávání: '"Neri Marsili"'
Autor:
Neri Marsili
Publikováno v:
Topoi. 42:369-384
Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to offer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an asse
Autor:
Neri Marsili
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Quarterly. 73:509-531
Can fictions make genuine assertions about the actual world? Proponents of the ‘Assertion View’ answer the question affirmatively: they hold that authors can assert, by means of explicit statements that are part of the work of fiction, that somet
Autor:
Neri Marsili
Publikováno v:
Utilitas. 33:502-505
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Autor:
Neri Marsili
Publikováno v:
Erkenntnis. 88:567-578
In a recent book (Lying and insincerity, Oxford University Press, 2018), Andreas Stokke argues that one lies iff one says something one believes to be false, thereby proposing that it becomes common ground. This paper shows that Stokke’s proposal i
Autor:
Neri Marsili
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 199:3245-3269
Not every speech act can be a lie. A good definition of lying should be able to draw the right distinctions between speech acts (like promises, assertions, and oaths) that can be lies and speech acts (like commands, suggestions, or assumptions) that
Autor:
Mitchell Green, Neri Marsili
In a series of articles (Pagin, 2004, 2009), Peter Pagin has argued that assertion is not a social speech act, introducing a method (which we baptize ‘the P-test’) designed to refute any account that defines assertion in terms of its social effec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::237b4a3c4eada7328ebcb551631038b9
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/820316
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/820316
Autor:
Neri Marsili
A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of counterexamples against this “Knowledge Account”
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fbf5c1ce26f5b68fd2ae8b8b11bf20fc
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/829828
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/829828
Autor:
Neri Marsili
Is truth the rule or the aim of assertion? Philosophers disagree. After reviewing the available evidence, the hypothesis that truth is the aim of assertion is defended against recent attempts to prove that truth is rather a rule of assertion.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c4659b609ce57266de4b3abd9e703aed
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/829830
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/829830
Autor:
Neri Marsili
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
What is assertion? An influential view holds that asserting a proposition involves undertaking a ‘commitment’ to the truth of that proposition. But accounts of what it is for someone to be committed to the truth of a proposition are often vague,
Autor:
Alex Wiegmann, Neri Marsili
There is a lively philosophical debate concerning which epistemic norm regulates assertion. Some scholars claim that such norm is factive (and only true propositions are assertable), while others deny this thesis (they contend that assertability does
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c1ef92d891e18d3ca8faa4ef35de5da4
https://psyarxiv.com/cs45j
https://psyarxiv.com/cs45j