Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 36
pro vyhledávání: '"Navin Kartik"'
The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the trend of many colleges moving to test-optional, and in some cases test-blind, admissions policies. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college is able to admit a student body th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d32d195dc62f601eb22d86b25d05ecf0
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.07551
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.07551
Autor:
Navin Kartik, Alexander Frankel
Publikováno v:
Journal of the European Economic Association. 20:79-115
Data-based decision making must account for the manipulation of data by agents who are aware of how decisions are being made and want to affect their allocations. We study a framework in which, due to such manipulation, data become less informative w
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::da255d7607817834ff518b6e481b26a3
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab017
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab017
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review: Insights. 3:165-182
We develop a result on expected posteriors for Bayesians with heterogenous priors, dubbed information validates the prior (IVP). Under familiar ordering requirements, Anne expects a (Blackwell) more informative experiment to bring Bob's posterior mea
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9f62d51fefcfb30c8600cc1da2234707
https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20200284
https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20200284
Autor:
Alex Frankel, Navin Kartik
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy. 127:1739-1776
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::13f65ff160c5a37468dc49ea477ced76
https://doi.org/10.1086/701604
https://doi.org/10.1086/701604
Autor:
Richard Van Weelden, Navin Kartik
Publikováno v:
Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 14:131-157
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bc3e1a38e0d6d2ff378a248348527e3c
https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016057
https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016057
A proposer requires the approval of a veto player to change a status quo. Preferences are single peaked. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's ideal point. We study Proposer's optimal mechanism without transfers. Vetoer is given a menu, or a delegatio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::183242bc86f72f8187ec68cb78ce0753
Autor:
Navin Kartik, Alexander Frankel
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 13:697-727
How much information should a Central Bank (CB) have about (i) policy objectives and (ii) operational shocks to the effect of monetary policy? We consider a version of the Barro-Gordon credibility problem in which monetary policy signals an inflation
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::721e384f2ed1ccb180a20244f24a33c4
https://doi.org/10.3982/te2290
https://doi.org/10.3982/te2290
Autor:
Richard Van Weelden, Navin Kartik
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 86:755-784
Why do office-motivated politicians sometimes espouse views that are non-congruent with their electorate’s? Can non-congruent statements convey any information about what a politician will do if elected, and if so, why would voters elect a politici
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f05701fa6d2bf2d23e2bc7611cc88a40
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy009
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy009
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 115:933-938
How much do people lie, and how much do people trust communication when lying is possible? An important step toward answering these questions is understanding how communication is interpreted. This paper establishes in a canonical experiment that com
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f7aace7e856a445b1f540da5ce97915c
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1714171115
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1714171115
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 61:958-970
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy-relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on dis
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f9af5ad5fb4e8f067108e2203248f806
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12310
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12310