Zobrazeno 1 - 9
of 9
pro vyhledávání: '"Nathanaël Barrot"'
Publikováno v:
PLoS ONE, Vol 19, Iss 2, p e0289965 (2024)
We identify a new class of distributional constraints defined as a union of symmetric M-convex sets, which can represent a wide range of real-life constraints in two-sided matching settings. Since M-convexity is not closed under union, a union of sym
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/9e66652e633f407183ea486f7f5f2bc1
Publikováno v:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science ISBN: 9783031208614
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f188b5c2bdd7c76a260dc433d8c5d057
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20862-1_2
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20862-1_2
Publikováno v:
AAAI
Scopus-Elsevier
Scopus-Elsevier
We study hedonic games under friends appreciation, where each agent considers other agents friends, enemies, or unknown agents. Although existing work assumed that unknown agents have no impact on an agent’s preference, it may be that her preferenc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::79bf6b33c93c09317f03f1a553eeb057
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011756
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011756
Publikováno v:
AAMAS
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 34(1):23. SPRINGER
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 34(1):23. SPRINGER
We introduce a new type of distributional constraints called ratio constraints, which explicitly specify the required balance among schools in two-sided matching. Since ratio constraints do not belong to the known well-behaved class of constraints ca
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f667b96b7542f101b4b420c09e451868
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-020-09448-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-020-09448-9
Publikováno v:
IJCAI
We investigate hedonic games under enemies aversion and friends appreciation, where every agent considers other agents as either a friend or an enemy. We extend these simple preferences by allowing each agent to also consider other agents to be neutr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::23d9cb6a8df90ef0e86fab8ff9be4193
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/51
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/51
Publikováno v:
Revue des Sciences et Technologies de l'Information-Série RIA : Revue d'Intelligence Artificielle
Revue des Sciences et Technologies de l'Information-Série RIA : Revue d'Intelligence Artificielle, Lavoisier, 2015, 29 (3-4), ⟨10.3166/RIA.29.265-291⟩
Revue des Sciences et Technologies de l'Information-Série RIA : Revue d'Intelligence Artificielle, Lavoisier, 2015, 29 (3-4), ⟨10.3166/RIA.29.265-291⟩
National audience; Approval voting is a well-known voting procedure used, among others, for electing committees, where each voter casts a ballot consisting of a set of approved candidates (without any cardinality constraint). Two prominent rules for
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8720bb1e2c2067274bd7b1745b4ad1f9
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01493014
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01493014
Publikováno v:
Algorithmic Decision Theory ISBN: 9783642415746
ADT
Algorithmic Decision Theory
Third International Conference, ADT 2013
Third International Conference, ADT 2013, Nov 2013, Bruxelles, Belgium. pp.57-70, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_5⟩
ADT
Algorithmic Decision Theory
Third International Conference, ADT 2013
Third International Conference, ADT 2013, Nov 2013, Bruxelles, Belgium. pp.57-70, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_5⟩
International audience; Given the knowledge of the preferences of a set of voters over a set of candidates, and assuming that voters cast sincere approval ballots, what can we say about the possible (co-)winners? The outcome depends on the number of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8fe7a1b8b88a98493f87632944d79169
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_5
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_5
Publikováno v:
Scopus-Elsevier
IJCAI
IJCAI
We identify a new class of distributional constraints defined as a union of symmetric M-convex sets, which can represent a variety of real-life constraints in two-sided matching settings. Since M-convexity is not closed under union, a union of symmet
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8a9669ab87d3baab0abd4fc88d103f57
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-85055706286&partnerID=MN8TOARS
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-85055706286&partnerID=MN8TOARS
Publikováno v:
Scopus-Elsevier
AAAI
AAAI
Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit, non-wastefulness, a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::07f225d9bd72ee4d25ce3f561abbe341
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-85091753567&partnerID=MN8TOARS
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-85091753567&partnerID=MN8TOARS