Zobrazeno 1 - 7
of 7
pro vyhledávání: '"Nate Mathews"'
Publikováno v:
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Vol 2021, Iss 2, Pp 305-322 (2021)
We introduce Generative Adversarial Networks for Data-Limited Fingerprinting (GANDaLF), a new deep-learning-based technique to perform Website Fingerprinting (WF) on Tor traffic. In contrast to most earlier work on deep-learning for WF, GANDaLF is in
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::81a74d54ff783f07f166e58e4c0af0b2
https://doaj.org/article/925f5192af9f4da1bfe7ccd2e9d72b37
https://doaj.org/article/925f5192af9f4da1bfe7ccd2e9d72b37
Autor:
Se Eun Oh, Taiji Yang, Nate Mathews, James K Holland, Mohammad Saidur Rahman, Nicholas Hopper, Matthew Wright
Publikováno v:
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP).
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9c5f00f82ee52740ed6d43f3b2410dbf
https://doi.org/10.1109/sp46214.2022.9833801
https://doi.org/10.1109/sp46214.2022.9833801
Autor:
Mohammad Saidur Rahman, Kantha Girish Gangadhara, Payap Sirinam, Matthew Wright, Nate Mathews
Publikováno v:
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Vol 2020, Iss 3, Pp 5-24 (2020)
A passive local eavesdropper can leverage Website Fingerprinting (WF) to deanonymize the web browsing activity of Tor users. The value of timing information to WF has often been discounted in recent works due to the volatility of low-level timing inf
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cfb554f44b4a1e8313bbc36aa57ce401
https://doi.org/10.2478/popets-2020-0043
https://doi.org/10.2478/popets-2020-0043
Publikováno v:
WPES@CCS
It is estimated that by the year 2024, the total number of systems equipped with voice assistant software will exceed 8.4 billion devices globally. While these devices provide convenience to consumers, they suffer from a myriad of security issues. Th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fb9abe0bfe67e275b1350d378f4f1647
https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485615
https://doi.org/10.1145/3463676.3485615
Publikováno v:
CCS
The website fingerprinting attack allows a low-resource attacker to compromise the privacy guarantees provided by privacy enhancing tools such as Tor. In response, researchers have proposed defenses aimed at confusing the classification tools used by
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cf3fc2c65d388d0cec32e5c6a49ba198
https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363272
https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363272
Website Fingerprinting (WF) is a type of traffic analysis attack that enables a local passive eavesdropper to infer the victim's activity, even when the traffic is protected by a VPN or an anonymity system like Tor. Leveraging a deep-learning classif
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::db09679800652a8b2549dd4257b50c01
Publikováno v:
2018 IEEE Western New York Image and Signal Processing Workshop (WNYISPW).
The Tor anonymity system is vulnerable to website fingerprinting attacks that can reveal users Internet browsing behavior. The state-of-the-art website fingerprinting attacks use convolutional neural networks to automatically extract features from pa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::df677f4ddce445a19919c4b148fa7b89
https://doi.org/10.1109/wnyipw.2018.8576379
https://doi.org/10.1109/wnyipw.2018.8576379