Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 79
pro vyhledávání: '"Nasre, Meghana"'
We consider the Hospital/Residents (HR) problem in the presence of ties in preference lists. Among the three notions of stability, viz. weak, strong, and super stability, we focus on the notion of strong stability. Strong stability has many desirable
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.10284
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools, when students have different utilities for schools and schools have capacity. There are additional group fairness considerations over students that can be captured either by concave objectives
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.15623
We consider the stable marriage problem in the presence of ties in preferences and critical vertices. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G = (A U B, E) where A and B denote sets of vertices which need to be matched. Each vertex has a prefe
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.12325
Matching problems with group-fairness constraints and diversity constraints have numerous applications such as in allocation problems, committee selection, school choice, etc. Moreover, online matching problems have lots of applications in ad allocat
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2208.11378
We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G=(A U B, E), where each vertex in A U B specifies a strict preference ordering
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2206.12394
We consider the problem of assigning items to platforms in the presence of group fairness constraints. In the input, each item belongs to certain categories, called classes in this paper. Each platform specifies the group fairness constraints through
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2105.09522
Autor:
Limaye, Girija, Nasre, Meghana
We consider the problem of assigning agents to programs in the presence of two-sided preferences, commonly known as the Hospital Residents problem. In the standard setting each program has a rigid upper-quota which cannot be violated. Motivated by ap
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2101.04425
Publikováno v:
In Theoretical Computer Science 8 January 2024 982
We consider the problem of matchings under two-sided preferences in the presence of maximum as well as minimum quota requirements for the agents. This setting, studied as the Hospital Residents with Lower Quotas (HRLQ) in literature, models important
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1910.07159
We present trade-offs in the incremental and fully dynamic settings to maintian a proper coloring. For any fully dynamic $2$-coloring algorithm, the maximum of the update time, number of recolorings, and query time is $\Omega(\log n)$. We present a d
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1909.07854