Eductive expectations coordination on deterministic cycles in an economy with identical fundamentals

Autor: NEGRONI, GIORGIO GIOVANNI

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______4094::7aa398053923af936a4d5d204426ee09
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/4957

On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies

Autor: Giorgio Negroni, Lidia Bagnoli

Publikováno v: Bagnoli, Lidia ; Negroni, Giorgio (2012) On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 39. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3907 . In: Quaderni-Working Paper DSE (858). ISSN 2282-6483.

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Ga

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d51021133ec3752712d0b19b6810b4b9
http://amsacta.unibo.it/3907/