Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 29
pro vyhledávání: '"N. P. Hughes"'
Autor:
N. M. Hughes, T. Mou, K. N. O’Regan, P. Murphy, J. N. O’Sullivan, E. Wolsztynski, J. Huang, M. P. Kennedy, J. F. Eary, F. O’Sullivan
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Hybrid Imaging, Vol 2, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2018)
Abstract Background The aim of this study was to evaluate primary tumor heterogeneity in patients with FDG-avid non-small cell lung cancer on PET/CT, with a view to optimising prognostic information from the metabolic signature of the primary tumor.
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/cf1f5d950470478bbc28a0db3819d11a
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 106:368-393
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 179:163-196
Epistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 27:591-596
1. Edouard Machery is sceptical of the ambitions of philosophers.1 They seek to uncover metaphysical necessities, and in order to do so they rely on judgements about far-fetched hypothetical cases....
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Utilitas. 30:439-457
It is widely thought that moral obligations are necessarily guidance giving. This supposed fact has been put to service in defence of the ‘ought-implies-can’ principle according to which one cannot be morally obligated to do the impossible, since
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Inquiry. 62:168-184
I describe two ways of thinking about what constitutes a knowledgeable assertion – the ‘orthodox view’ and the ‘isomorphic view’. I argue that we should discard the orthodox view and replace it with the isomorphic view. The latter is more n
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Erkenntnis. 84:57-75
I argue that it is epistemically permissible to believe that P when it is epistemically rational to believe that P. Unlike previous defenses of this claim, this argument is not vulnerable to the claim that permissibility is being confused with excusa
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Utilitas. 30:73-85
It is often argued that the requirement that moral obligations be ‘action guiding’ motivates the claim that one can be obligated to φ only if one can φ. I argue that even on its most plausible interpretation, this argument fails.
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 6:157-166
Recently it has been increasingly popular to argue that knowledge is the norm of belief. I present an argument against this view. The argument trades on the epistemic situation of the subject in the bad case. Notably, unlike with other superficially
Autor:
Sonia Li, Simon Lord, N P Hughes, Ruud G.P.M. van Stiphout, Andreas Makris, R F Adams, Adrian M. Jubb, Lefteris Koumakis, S Mehta, Francesca M. Buffa, Adrian L. Harris, Anwar R. Padhani
Publikováno v:
EBioMedicine
EBioMedicine, Vol 10, Iss C, Pp 109-116 (2016)
EBioMedicine, Vol 10, Iss C, Pp 109-116 (2016)
Anti-VEGF antibody bevacizumab has prolonged progression-free survival in several cancer types, however acquired resistance is common. Adaption has been observed pre-clinically, but no human study has shown timing and genes involved, enabling formula