Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 392
pro vyhledávání: '"N. P. Hughes"'
Akademický článek
Tento výsledek nelze pro nepřihlášené uživatele zobrazit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.
Autor:
N. M. Hughes, T. Mou, K. N. O’Regan, P. Murphy, J. N. O’Sullivan, E. Wolsztynski, J. Huang, M. P. Kennedy, J. F. Eary, F. O’Sullivan
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Hybrid Imaging, Vol 2, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2018)
Abstract Background The aim of this study was to evaluate primary tumor heterogeneity in patients with FDG-avid non-small cell lung cancer on PET/CT, with a view to optimising prognostic information from the metabolic signature of the primary tumor.
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/cf1f5d950470478bbc28a0db3819d11a
Publikováno v:
Cretaceous Research; April 1993, Vol. 14 Issue: 2 p245-251, 7p
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 106:368-393
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4d955fdcc30bdb9fbf4fdbfd541d8e13
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12849
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12849
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 179:163-196
Epistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::98c3cd3841a43e912a435fd6926061ad
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01655-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01655-8
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 27:591-596
1. Edouard Machery is sceptical of the ambitions of philosophers.1 They seek to uncover metaphysical necessities, and in order to do so they rely on judgements about far-fetched hypothetical cases....
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6dd11363620eaa6fdac9a2c57e040231
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2019.1655949
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2019.1655949
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Utilitas. 30:439-457
It is widely thought that moral obligations are necessarily guidance giving. This supposed fact has been put to service in defence of the ‘ought-implies-can’ principle according to which one cannot be morally obligated to do the impossible, since
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0aa60c9bc8c30fc04d49300930734fbd
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820818000092
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820818000092
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Inquiry. 62:168-184
I describe two ways of thinking about what constitutes a knowledgeable assertion – the ‘orthodox view’ and the ‘isomorphic view’. I argue that we should discard the orthodox view and replace it with the isomorphic view. The latter is more n
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e9e641167a71dfd26a830f290f5069f2
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2017.1405843
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2017.1405843
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Erkenntnis. 84:57-75
I argue that it is epistemically permissible to believe that P when it is epistemically rational to believe that P. Unlike previous defenses of this claim, this argument is not vulnerable to the claim that permissibility is being confused with excusa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c1b45d2c261bed9da355d5142d2812bb
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9947-6
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9947-6
Autor:
N P Hughes
Publikováno v:
Utilitas. 30:73-85
It is often argued that the requirement that moral obligations be ‘action guiding’ motivates the claim that one can be obligated to φ only if one can φ. I argue that even on its most plausible interpretation, this argument fails.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ae0273a8a3ce98a1e2349211d0534fea
https://doi.org/10.1017/s095382081700005x
https://doi.org/10.1017/s095382081700005x