Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 25
pro vyhledávání: '"Murhekar, Aniket"'
We study fair division of $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents with additive preferences. We consider the desirable fairness notions of envy-freeness up to any chore (EFX) and envy-freeness up to $k$ chores (EF$k$), alongside the efficiency notion
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.03318
We investigate the existence of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible chores to asymmetric agents who have unequal entitlements or weights. We consider the fairness notion of weighted envy-freeness up to one chore (wEF1) and the efficiency no
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.17173
Autor:
Murhekar, Aniket, Sharma, Eklavya
We introduce and initiate the study of a natural class of repeated two-player matrix games, called Repeated-Until-Collision (RUC) games. In each round, both players simultaneously pick an action from a common action set $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$. Dependin
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2309.15870
Several cloud-based applications, such as cloud gaming, rent servers to execute jobs which arrive in an online fashion. Each job has a resource demand and must be dispatched to a cloud server which has enough resources to execute the job, which depar
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.08648
We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible chores among agents with additive disutility functions. We consider the widely-used envy-based fairness properties of EF1 and EFX, in conjunction with the efficiency property of fr
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2212.02440
Autor:
Garg, Jugal, Murhekar, Aniket
We study the problem of fair and efficient allocation of a set of indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations using the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and equitability up to one good (EQ1) in conjunction with
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2204.14229
We study the problem of finding fair and efficient allocations of a set of indivisible items to a set of agents, where each item may be a good (positively valued) for some agents and a bad (negatively valued) for others, i.e., a mixed manna. As fairn
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.02672
We study the problem of maximizing Nash welfare (MNW) while allocating indivisible goods to asymmetric agents. The Nash welfare of an allocation is the weighted geometric mean of agents' utilities, and the allocation with maximum Nash welfare is know
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2112.10199
We study the problem of fair and efficient allocation of a set of indivisible chores to agents with additive cost functions. We consider the popular fairness notion of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) with the efficiency notion of Pareto-optimality
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2110.09601
We study fair allocation of indivisible public goods subject to cardinality (budget) constraints. In this model, we have n agents and m available public goods, and we want to select $k \leq m$ goods in a fair and efficient manner. We first establish
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2107.09871