Výsledky vyhledávání - "Moreira, Humberto Ataíde"

Intrahousehold inequality and the joint taxation of household earnings

Autor: Alves, Cassiano Breno Machado, Costa, Carlos Eugênio da, Moreira, Humberto Ataíde

Publikováno v: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV

We study the optimal design of nonlinear labor income tax for multiperson households. Each household consists of two workers with different productivity levels and unequal access to the family’s economic resources. We show how intrahousehold inequa

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______3056::f3b3e57d72d41df8bd50bd0394563e93

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Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models

Autor: Pires, Henrique Brasiliense de Castro, Moreira, Humberto Ataíde

Publikováno v: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV

This paper analyzes the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. We show that a limited liability constraint causes pooling of the most efficient

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______3056::6915e484602fc4884c5eec8417e1702d

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A critical value function approach, with an application to persistent time-series

Autor: Moreira, Marcelo J., Mourão, Rafael, Moreira, Humberto Ataíde

Publikováno v: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV

Researchers often rely on the t-statistic to make inference on parameters in statistical models. It is common practice to obtain critical values by simulation techniques. This paper proposes a novel numerical method to obtain an approximately similar

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Optimal two-sided tests for instrumental variables regression with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors

Autor: Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, Moreira, Marcelo J.

Publikováno v: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV

This paper considers two-sided tests for the parameter of an endogenous variable in an instrumental variable (IV) model with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors. We develop the nite-sample theory of weighted-average power (WAP) tests with norma

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::cb6925981110b22a208fe3b0d1b3e6c3
http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/10438/13722/3/Optimal-Two-Sided-Tests-for-Instrumental-Variables-Regression-with-Heteroskedastic-and-Autocorrelated-Errors.pdf

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Contributions to the Theory of Optimal Tests

Autor: Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, Moreira, Marcelo J.

Publikováno v: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV

This paper considers tests which maximize the weighted average power (WAP). The focus is on determining WAP tests subject to an uncountable number of equalities and/or inequalities. The unifying theory allows us to obtain tests with correct size, sim

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Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions

Autor: Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de, Castro Filho, Luciano I. de

Publikováno v: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV

We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in interdependent values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. In this case, non-monotonic equilibria might

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::a4d806207e5718db5ab3244f8e8f1cb7
http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/10438/1010/1/1745.pdf

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A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignaling an the GED

Autor: Gottlieb, Daniel, Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de

Publikováno v: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV

We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is that countersignaling is more e

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::12216cd9eea3ac4bbd0ad44ffd53e6d5
http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/10438/595/1/1644.pdf

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Common agency with informed principals

Autor: Martimort, David, Moreira, Humberto Ataíde

Publikováno v: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of tru

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::96bf620762118e82793a3925bced7e81

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Common agency with informed principals

Autor: Moreira, Humberto Ataíde

Publikováno v: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the ear

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______3056::3c728432ca69f209e227bbdd7f5946b6

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Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision

Autor: Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, Costa, Cristiano Machado, Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares

Publikováno v: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV

We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are pre

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