Zobrazeno 1 - 7
of 7
pro vyhledávání: '"Mikel Bedayo"'
Publikováno v:
Latin American Journal of Central Banking, Vol 1, Iss 1, Pp 100003- (2020)
In this paper, we analyze the role bank capital played in systemic banking crises and in lending expansion and contraction for nearly 150 years in Spain. We first build a measure of capital ratio (i.e., the capital to assets ratio) for Spain's bankin
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/7e8fc8eb1a344f79becd0a292c20ec67
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We show that loan origination time is key for bank lending standards, cycles, defaults and failures. We exploit the credit register from Spain, with the time of a loan application and its granting. When VIX is lower (booms), banks shorten loan origin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b04771ff73adb99cfba3a6a1b404df09
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3742006
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3742006
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this paper we analyze the effect of bank capital on lending expansion and contraction for nearly 150 years in Spain. We fi rst build up thoroughly a measure of bank leverage (i.e. the capital to assets ratio) for the Spanish banking sector startin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b049b532e0e7621cc0edb38807079063
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3306558
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3306558
Autor:
Mikel Bedayo
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Firms’ incentives to join up with other firms to apply collectively for a single loan are studied empirically in this paper. When several firms make a joint application for a single loan an association of firms is created. We identify the associati
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b5687febb30cf3e106d729326ec55443
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2906225
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2906225
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 80, p. 70-82 (March 2016)
We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where linking costs are positive but infinitesimally small. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c50d9fcbd41ffcf9ada3c46e49e02a60
https://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/175010
https://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/175010
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the tradin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::51fa1a690377f779115b2fa174835c2a
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2210328
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2210328
We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the tradin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::8a76f56600ccdb29809b121e414c6c47
http://uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2012_46web.pdf
http://uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2012_46web.pdf