Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 32
pro vyhledávání: '"Michael Landsberger"'
Autor:
Michael Landsberger
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 132:119-136
Participation in economic games such as auctions is typically costly, which means that players (potential bidders) must consider whether to participate. Such decisions may be no less crucial than how to bid, and yet the literature has been mostly con
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::35bcb56e4f940884d21de32d0c5f5d79
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.010
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.010
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2:135-153
We investigate how redistribution of income is affected by the fact that income is privately observed and agents may not be truthful in their reports to tax authorities. In response, the government establishes an audit mechanism with penalties. Adher
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5010e4a876d8e9a4ddf88af578eaf262
https://doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00032
https://doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00032
Autor:
Michael Landsberger, Isaac Meilijson
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 14:331-352
This paper considers optimal insurance schemes in a principal-agent multi-dimensional environment in which two types of risk averse agents differ in both risk and attitude to risk. Risk corresponds to any pair of distribution functions (not necessari
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9070bfdccf2b1911a0677c5b0ca05b55
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050297
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050297
Autor:
Michael Landsberger, Isaac Meilijson
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 69:234-239
We consider a principal-agent setting with two types of risk averse agents with different abilities to avoid losses. Abilities (types) are characterized by two distributions F and G which are agents' private information. All agents have the same incr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6cf09be3b3c7e20bc4a2d18bc0823859
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0049
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0049
Autor:
Isaac Meilijson, Michael Landsberger
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 63:392-407
This paper considers a profit maximizing monopolistic insurer who offers insurance to two types of risk averse agents in an environment where the uninsured position has the same distribution across types, agents′ utility functions are private infor
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5c229c2e2d7cfc10bc9dd5c479476a2a
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1048
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1048
Autor:
Isaac Meilijson, Michael Landsberger
Publikováno v:
Annals of Operations Research. 52:97-106
For every integrable allocation (X 1,X 2, ...,X n ) of a random endowmentY=Σ =1/ X i amongn agents, there is another allocation (X 1*,X 2*, ...,X n *) such that for every 1≤i≤n,X i * is a nondecreasing function ofY (or, (X 1*,X 2*, ...,X n *) ar
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4dbba5b47fa920a69de2559610602f76
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02033185
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02033185
Autor:
Michael Landsberger, Isaac Meilijson
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 40:662-669
A generating process of Jewitt's location independent risk concept is derived in terms of left stretches based on single crossings between distributions. For concave nondecreasing utility functions this stochastic order preserves monotonicity between
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bf0b1d740abd146e90cb1551c1e60759
Autor:
Michael Landsberger, Isaac Meilijson
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 52:1-17
Most agents insure against risks which entail large losses, but few insure against small losses. The fact that organized lotteries charge low ticket prices examplifies this spirit. This weakly risk averse behavior pattern seems to be well structured
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::122fc0c31195315e570a1c4b77329e2e
https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90064-q
https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90064-q
Autor:
Michael Landsberger, Isaac Meilijson
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 50:204-213
Demand for risky financial assets takes place in portfolio settings. The common stochastic orders applied in economics fail to rank demand for assets in such situations even for risk-averse investors. Therefore, the evaluation of the relative desirab
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::09f0dd6db38ceb450b0c9f473bf5ef7c
https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90092-x
https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90092-x
Autor:
Boris Tsirelson, Michael Landsberger
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Actions in games that address economic environments such as auctions and oligopoly games are typically costly, and signals, or types, are interdependent. Consequently, such games may not have equilibria supported by monotone strategies, monotone equi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9f95bc99b007509d375baba559ff1b35
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.288810
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.288810