Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 178
pro vyhledávání: '"Micali, Silvio"'
Autor:
Chen, Jing, Micali, Silvio
A public ledger is a tamperproof sequence of data that can be read and augmented by everyone. Public ledgers have innumerable and compelling uses. They can secure, in plain sight, all kinds of transactions ---such as titles, sales, and payments--- in
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1607.01341
Autor:
Lepinski, Matthew, Micali, Silvio
In their paper, "Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design," Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali show that any one-shot mediated game can be simulated by the players themselves, without the help of a trusted mediator, using physical envelopes
Externí odkaz:
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30581
Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL) matrices implemented by sparse random synaptic connections are thought to be a prime candidate for how convergent pathways in the brain compress information. However, to date, there is no complete mathematical support for s
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1411.5383
We consider auctions in which the players have very limited knowledge about their own valuations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player $i$ has about the profile of true valuations, $\theta^*$, consists of a set of distributions,
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1403.6410
We consider players that have very limited knowledge about their own valuations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player $i$ has about the profile of true valuations, $\theta^*$, consists of a set of distributions, from one of whic
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1403.6411
We relate the strategy sets that a player ends up with after refining his own strategies according to two very different models of rationality: namely, utility maximization and regret minimization.
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1403.6394
We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant-strategy, and
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1403.6413
We consider auctions in which the players have very limited knowledge about their own valuations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player $i$ has about the profile of true valuations, $\theta^*$, consists of a set of distributions,
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1403.6409
Autor:
Chen, Jing, Micali, Silvio
Publikováno v:
In Theoretical Computer Science 19 July 2019 777:155-183
We study single-good auctions in a setting where each player knows his own valuation only within a constant multiplicative factor \delta{} in (0,1), and the mechanism designer knows \delta. The classical notions of implementation in dominant strategi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1112.1147