Zobrazeno 1 - 5
of 5
pro vyhledávání: '"Messan Agbaglah"'
Autor:
Jordan Gacutan, Kemal Pınarbaşı, Messan Agbaglah, Crystal Bradley, Ibon Galparsoro, Arantza Murillas, Ibukun Adewumi, Teerapong Praphotjanaporn, Michael Bordt, Kenneth Findlay, Coulson Lantz, Ben M. Milligan
Publikováno v:
Marine Policy. 140:105055
Publikováno v:
Applied Economics
Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2019, 52 (10), pp.1141-1162. ⟨10.1080/00036846.2019.1659496⟩
Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2019, 52 (10), pp.1141-1162. ⟨10.1080/00036846.2019.1659496⟩
International audience; We investigate the determinants of mobile money adoption process and whether its use helps households in Togo to be resilient to predictable and unpredictable life events. Using ordered logit and sequential logit models, our r
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2eaf085b9988736b9277ae9c4acfe32b
https://hal.univ-lorraine.fr/hal-02300913
https://hal.univ-lorraine.fr/hal-02300913
Autor:
Messan Agbaglah
This paper develops an extension of the recursive core to the setting of overlapping coalitions. We show that the cooperative game theoretical traditional way of separating a deviant coalition from the game played by the ones left behind is no more s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::8141e728dfde147558a8a40c4b6efa0b
http://gredi.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/wpapers/GREDI-1407.pdf
http://gredi.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/wpapers/GREDI-1407.pdf
Autor:
Messan Agbaglah
We introduce the game in cover function form, which is a bargaining game of sequential offers for endogenous overlapping coalitions. This extension of games in partition function form removes the restriction to disjoint coalitions. We discuss the exi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::59032e5858a0e4fdd1275d895ac7a9e3
http://gredi.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/wpapers/GREDI-1402.pdf
http://gredi.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/wpapers/GREDI-1402.pdf
Autor:
Messan Agbaglah, Lars Ehlers
Publikováno v:
BQGT
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f4af2336d2c6ea74d23de5ead04ceb4b
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43443
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43443