Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 1 235
pro vyhledávání: '"Mauras, A."'
We study online selection problems in both the prophet and secretary settings, when arriving agents have interdependent values. In the interdependent values model, introduced in the seminal work of Milgrom and Weber [1982], each agent has a private s
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.06293
How does auction design affect the division of surplus among buyers in auctions? We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to multi-unit auctions, in which unit demand buyers with private-common values pay mixtures of uniform and pay-
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.07799
Autor:
Castera, Rémi, Garrido-Lucero, Felipe, Molina, Mathieu, Mauras, Simon, Loiseau, Patrick, Perchet, Vianney
We investigate notions of group fairness in bipartite matching markets involving agents and jobs, where agents are grouped based on sensitive attributes. Employing a geometric approach, we characterize how many agents can be matched in each group, sh
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.00397
We study auction design within the widely acclaimed model of interdependent values, introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982]. In this model, every bidder $i$ has a private signal $s_i$ for the item for sale, and a public valuation function $v_i(s_1,\ld
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.12017
Publikováno v:
Physical Review RESEARCH 6, 033265 (2024)
Speckle patterns are inherent features of coherent light propagation through complex media. As a result of interference, they are sensitive to multiple experimental parameters such as the configuration of disorder or the propagating wavelength. Recen
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.08506
The celebrated model of auctions with interdependent valuations, introduced by Milgrom and Weber in 1982, has been studied almost exclusively under private signals $s_1, \ldots, s_n$ of the $n$ bidders and public valuation functions $v_i(s_1, \ldots,
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.00958
We study best-of-both-worlds guarantees for the fair division of indivisible items among agents with subadditive valuations. Our main result establishes the existence of a random allocation that is simultaneously ex-ante $\frac{1}{2}$-envy-free, ex-p
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.03706
A major problem in fair division is how to allocate a set of indivisible resources among agents fairly and efficiently. The goal of this work is to characterize the tradeoffs between two well-studied measures of fairness and efficiency -- envy freene
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.09633
Publikováno v:
50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023)
We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an item in her
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2211.02004
Autor:
Nalia Mekarnia, Benallal Kamal-Eddine, Jovana Sádlová, Barbora Vojtková, Aurélie Mauras, Nicolas Imbert, Maryline Longhitano, Zoubir Harrat, Petr Volf, Philippe M. Loiseau, Sandrine Cojean
Publikováno v:
International Journal for Parasitology: Drugs and Drug Resistance, Vol 25, Iss , Pp 100554- (2024)
Leishmania major is responsible for zoonotic cutaneous leishmaniasis. Therapy is mainly based on the use of antimony-based drugs; however, treatment failures and illness relapses were reported. Although studies were developed to understand mechanisms
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/909346ed74a34ba8bfd35aca9a1d09d4
