Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 47
pro vyhledávání: '"Matthijs van Veelen"'
Autor:
Aslihan Akdeniz, Matthijs van Veelen
Publikováno v:
Evolutionary Human Sciences, Vol 3 (2021)
A considerable share of the literature on the evolution of human cooperation considers the question why we have not evolved to play the Nash equilibrium in prisoners’ dilemmas or public goods games. In order to understand human morality and pro-soc
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/510d896d350d43a4a7020e94eb03572b
Autor:
Matthijs van Veelen
Publikováno v:
Evolutionary Human Sciences, Vol 2 (2020)
The debate on (cultural) group selection regularly suffers from an inclusive fitness overdose. The classical view is that all group selection is kin selection, and that Hamilton's rule works for all models. I claim that not all group selection is kin
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/532776b9620c449083568754aa79a637
Autor:
Matthijs van Veelen
Publikováno v:
eLife, Vol 7 (2018)
How generally Hamilton’s rule holds is a much debated question. The answer to that question depends on how costs and benefits are defined. When using the regression method to define costs and benefits, there is no scope for violations of Hamilton
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/c11161e8a8254cc293a0a3c087fb31cf
No Strategy Can Win in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Linking Game Theory and Computer Simulations
Autor:
Julián García, Matthijs van Veelen
Publikováno v:
Frontiers in Robotics and AI, Vol 5 (2018)
Computer simulations are regularly used for studying the evolution of strategies in repeated games. These simulations rarely pay attention to game theoretical results that can illuminate the data analysis or the questions being asked. Results from ev
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4fa15a2eeb884a348d79332181caf4bc
Autor:
Matthijs van Veelen, Julián García
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior, 115, 113-130. Academic Press Inc.
We explore evolutionary dynamics for repeated games with small, but positive complexity costs. We begin by extending a folk theorem result by Cooper (1996) to continuation probabilities, or discount rates, smaller than 1. Then we show that All D has
Autor:
Aslihan Akdeniz, Matthijs van Veelen
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Matthijs van Veelen, Aslihan Akdeniz
Publikováno v:
Evolutionary Human Sciences. 3
A considerable share of the literature on the evolution of human cooperation considers the question why we have not evolved to play the Nash equilibrium in prisoners’ dilemmas or public goods games. In order to understand human morality and pro-soc
Autor:
Aslihan Akdeniz, Matthijs van Veelen
Publikováno v:
Evolution, 74(7), 1246-1254. Wiley-Blackwell
Evolution; International Journal of Organic Evolution
Evolution; International Journal of Organic Evolution
Group selection models combine selection pressure at the individual level with selection pressure at the group level. Cooperation can be costly for individuals, but beneficial for the group, and therefore, if individuals are sufficiently much assorte
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::484b30540aefa475f0c06a0ae73b67f5
https://dare.uva.nl/personal/pure/en/publications/the-cancellation-effect-at-the-group-level(01df023f-05af-4f4c-a91c-31731acdc04c).html
https://dare.uva.nl/personal/pure/en/publications/the-cancellation-effect-at-the-group-level(01df023f-05af-4f4c-a91c-31731acdc04c).html
Autor:
Matthijs van Veelen
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 375(1797):20190355. Royal Society of London
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci
In this paper, I will argue that the generality of the Price equation comes at a cost, and that is that the terms in it become meaningless. There are simple linear models that can be written in a Price equation-like form, and for those the terms in t
Autor:
Theo Offerman, Boris van Leeuwen, Sigrid Suetens, Charles Noussair, Matthijs van Veelen, Jeroen van de Ven
Publikováno v:
Management Science, 64(7), 3352-3364. INFORMS Inst.for Operations Res.and the Management Sciences
Evolutionary explanations of anger as a commitment device hinge on two key assumptions. The first is that it is predictable, ex ante, whether someone will get angry when feeling that he or she has been badly treated. The second is that anger is assoc