Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 79
pro vyhledávání: '"Matthias Efing"'
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202916; We show that banker bonuses cannot be understood exclusively as incentive contracts, but also incorporate a significant risk sharing dimension between bank shareholders and bank employees. This contrasts with the co
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2fa778c6267892585e5f19f903e456d2
https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-234465
https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-234465
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics. 134:297-317
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders’ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the ef
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8bde9f1f0fcc4a38bd14ca50ffd347d5
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.04.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.04.001
Autor:
Matthias Efing
Publikováno v:
Review of Finance. 24:929-959
If regulation fails to differentiate between priced and idiosyncratic risk, it incentivizes investors to reach for yield. Studying securitization exposures on the balance sheets of German banks, I show evidence consistent with this prediction. Banks
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8a722f78dc069971ecacc42db43dc0ab
https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfz013
https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfz013
Autor:
Matthias Efing, Patrick Kampkötter
How do banks remunerate risk managers and what are the implications for risk-taking? Studying 127 German banks during the years 2003 to 2007, we show that risk managers' remuneration is positively aligned with performance-linked pay in front offices
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::39dc2d807793d696b8ea1ca50d0e4de9
https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02953045
https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02953045
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Credit derivatives give creditors the possibility to transfer debt cash flow rights to other market participants while retaining control rights. We use the market for credit default swaps (CDSs) as a laboratory to show that the real effects of such d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b17cd2f50346b3a6b248160e1e57caef
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2787062
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2787062
Autor:
Matthias Efing
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ad34a15a9ca7941fdd3099f1eef51c5c
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3723367
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3723367
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Credit derivatives give creditors the possibility to transfer debt cash flow rights to other market participants while retaining control rights. We use the market for credit default swaps (CDSs) as a laboratory to show that the real effects of this t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2de0d4ea5b52f3892d1408abc08c68cc
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2749079
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2749079
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The Swiss National Bank surprisingly announced in January 2015 that it would no longer hold the Swiss franc at a fixed exchange rate of 1.2 Swiss francs per Euro, a peg it had defended for more than three years. The Swiss franc appreciated by approxi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::55409c22d396291aae0d154caa68db59
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2709637
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2709637
Parallel zum Privatsektor versuchen auch die Aufsichtsbehörden, die Vergütungspraktiken in Banken zu reformieren. Bemerkenswert dabei ist die Bandbreite an teils stark voneinander abweichenden Reformansätzen, was vor allem dem Mangel an empirische
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::76476a70dd547f5390ac262d6148a738
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/165546
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/165546
Autor:
Harald Hau, Matthias Efing
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 116, No 1 (2015) pp. 46-60
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 116 (2015) pp. 46-60
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 116 (2015) pp. 46-60
This paper tests for conflicts of interest in the rating process of European asset- and mortgage-backed securities based on a new aggregation method for a deal's different tranche ratings. Controlling for a large set of determinants of credit risk, w
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a2c1a9b5f413120b361bbe92eae6c084
https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:45308
https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:45308