Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 16
pro vyhledávání: '"Mathijs Jansen"'
Autor:
Mathijs Jansen, Dries Vermeulen
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 41, 735-763. Elsevier Science
In this paper, an alternative definition of stable sets, defined by Mertens [Mertens, 1989. Stable equilibria – a reformulation. Part I. Definitions and basic properties. Mathematics of Operations Research 14, 575–625], is given where perturbatio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::10f02a46c44cd93fa054ac0ff8410614
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.09.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.09.003
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory, 32, 371-377
International Journal of Game Theory, 32, 3, pp. 371-377
International Journal of Game Theory, 32, 3, pp. 371-377
Hillas (1990) introduced a definition of strategic stability based on perturbations of the best reply correspondence that satisfies all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hillas et al. (2001) point out though that the proofs of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::88c3df7435c5e29bf9f9217056872764
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400168
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400168
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences, 41, 111-130. Elsevier
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) argued that a solution concept to a game should be invariant under the addition or deletion of an equivalent strategy and not require the use of weakly dominated strategies. In this paper we study which of these requiremen
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::15ea7868e933a74db0b2184ebc67cfb6
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(00)00056-1
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(00)00056-1
Autor:
A.J. Vermeulen, Mathijs Jansen
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory, 17, 325-344. Springer Verlag
Summary. In this paper a procedure is described that computes for a given bimatrix game all stable sets in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Further the procedure is refined to find the strictly perfect equilibria (if any) of such a game.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ce149c3e392b4a3191372b387ebd8bf6
https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004106
https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004106
Autor:
Mathijs Jansen, A.J. Vermeulen
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 36(36), 161-167. Elsevier Science
In this paper, it is shown in an example that the original definition of stable sets in Hillas [Econometrica 58 (1990) 1365–1391] does not satisfy (an even slightly weakenened version of) the invariance condition proposed in Mertens [Ordinality in
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d93f16097c11469284c304f8c6bf658c
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00073-8
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00073-8
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 29:433-450
By a player splitting we mean a mechanism that distributes the information sets of a player among so-called agents. A player splitting is called independent if each path in the game tree contains at most one agent of every player. Following Mertens (
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::911ad1b66c931560b78bb96576eef9dd
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000051
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000051
Autor:
Mathijs Jansen, A.J. Vermeulen
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 33:13-34
In this paper we reformulate Mertens' definition of ordinality for solutions defined on the class of strategic form games. Using this reformulation, the relations between (strong) invariance, abr-invariance and ordinality can easily be described. Thi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9b23c30dc9c73205b1a8f8cf3c08496b
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00011-7
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00011-7
Autor:
Mathijs Jansen, Dries Vermeulen
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research. 106:204-211
The goal of this paper is twofold. Firstly a short proof of the unicity of the reduced form of a normal form game is provided, using a technique to reduce a game originally introduced by Mertens. Secondly a direct combinatorial-geometric interpretati
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::85e885a3eda350502299e9433469a740
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(97)00198-7
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(97)00198-7
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 21:238-252
In this paper an algebraic characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games (in the sense of 3 , is given. As a corollary, we show that consistency can be characterized by so-called “simple” sequences of assessments. The algebra
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dcbd7f24e09b41c12da34ce46b0f9486
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0584
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0584
Autor:
Mathijs Jansen, A.J. Vermeulen
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 21:135-147
In this paper we show that an invariant solution for normal form games can be extended uniquely to an invariant solution for strategic form games. This result has the following consequence for the reduction of a (normal form) game. Suppose that the p
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::620fb0fb2c34f7a3c1fdab25c4131167
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0503
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0503