Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 22
pro vyhledávání: '"Martin Szydlowski"'
Autor:
Martin Szydlowski, Ivan Marinovic
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 53:404-428
We provide a novel theory of monitoring. A monitor with career concerns oversees an agent and generates verifiable evidence if the agent shirks. The monitor's ability is uncertain and requires costly investment to maintain. The equilibrium features a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::09d8ad56d341b4530cf0dd7e09013627
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12412
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12412
Autor:
Martin Szydlowski
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5feddb096abf21c406dd119dee71d054
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4398140
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4398140
Autor:
Martin Szydlowski
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 67:436-454
I study an entrepreneur who finances a project with uncertain cash flows and who jointly chooses the disclosure and financing policies. In the Bayesian persuasion framework, I show that it is optimal to truthfully reveal whether the project’s cash
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e02281cec16227a4895df7ef7317aea6
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3462
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3462
Autor:
Martin Szydlowski, Jeffrey C. Ely
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy. 128:468-506
We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard framework. An agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty, modeled as the duration of required effort. The principal knows th...
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::92d44c9bac2e11d921845b2d775da6aa
https://doi.org/10.1086/704387
https://doi.org/10.1086/704387
Autor:
Martin Szydlowski
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a8b692e3eaa6f993a3246fb32903dcf9
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4174616
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4174616
Autor:
Briana Chang, Martin Szydlowski
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Finance. 75:867-903
We study decentralized markets in which advisers have conflicts of interest and compete for customers via information provision. We show that competition partially disciplines conflicted advisers. The equilibrium features information dispersion and s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::020742b43ac399c8480087eaa9f6832e
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12848
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12848
Autor:
Martin Szydlowski
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 14:813-847
I study the optimal choice of investment projects in a continuous time moral hazard model with multitasking. While in the first best, projects are invariably chosen by the net present value (NPV) criterion, moral hazard introduces a cutoff for projec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::40e82deb3cf62e5a26983c0f6f8b32ed
https://doi.org/10.3982/te2858
https://doi.org/10.3982/te2858
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::553bd9afd5f1d755a20332807dcfef4f
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3923908
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3923908
Autor:
Martin Szydlowski, Snehal Banerjee
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We provide a theory of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, or SPACs. A sponsor raises financing for a new opportunity from a group of investors with differing ability to process information. We show that when all investors are rational, the sponso
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::419c291bab1bdb776cb0d577996b1dd2
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3930346
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3930346
Autor:
Martin Szydlowski, Ivan Marinovic
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor’s reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate r
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c67f7ad9065e73669261cd9dc66969ca
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3703870
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3703870