Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 295
pro vyhledávání: '"Martin Bichler"'
Taming the Communication and Computation Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: The FUEL Bid Language
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 69:2217-2238
Combinatorial auctions have found widespread application for allocating multiple items in the presence of complex bidder preferences. The enumerative exclusive OR (XOR) bid language is the de facto standard bid language for spectrum auctions and othe
Publikováno v:
Transportation Science. 57:27-51
The growth in air traffic (before the Covid-19 pandemic) made airport time slots an increasingly scarce resource (and it is believed that this growth will continue after recovery). It is widely acknowledged that the grandfathering schemes used nowada
Publikováno v:
Information Systems Research. 33:1126-1129
Publikováno v:
INFORMS Journal on Computing.
Computing Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies in auction games is a challenging problem that is not well-understood. Such equilibria can be modeled as systems of nonlinear partial differential equations. It was recently shown that neural pseudogradi
Publikováno v:
Nature Machine Intelligence. 3:687-695
Auction theory is of central importance in the study of markets. Unfortunately, we do not know equilibrium bidding strategies for most auction games. For realistic markets with multiple items and value interdependencies, the Bayes Nash equilibria (BN
Publikováno v:
Information Systems Research.
Climate change and the transition to renewable energy sources have had a significant impact on wholesale electricity markets. This has led to renewed interest in the design of electricity markets and pricing rules for spot markets. It is well known t
Publikováno v:
Information Systems Research, 32(2), 335-355. INFORMS Inst.for Operations Res.and the Management Sciences
Bichler, M, Hammerl, A, Morrill, T & Waldherr, S 2021, ' How to assign scarce resources without money : Designing information systems that are efficient, truthful, and (pretty) fair ', Information Systems Research, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 335-355 . https://doi.org/10.1287/ISRE.2020.0959
Bichler, M, Hammerl, A, Morrill, T & Waldherr, S 2021, ' How to assign scarce resources without money : Designing information systems that are efficient, truthful, and (pretty) fair ', Information Systems Research, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 335-355 . https://doi.org/10.1287/ISRE.2020.0959
Matching with preferences has great potential to coordinate the efficient allocation of scarce resources in organizations when monetary transfers are not available and thus can provide a powerful design principle for information systems. Unfortunatel
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research. 291:711-721
Ex-post split-award auctions are a frequently used form of combinatorial auction mechanism in practice. The procurement quantity is split into several shares and suppliers can submit bids on separate shares as well as on the entire quantity. Markets
We study markets where a set of indivisible items is sold to bidders with unit-demand valuations, subject to a hard budget limit. Without financial constraints and pure quasilinear bidders, this assignment model allows for a simple ascending auction
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d3c7ade41ac98307753f1d47814953bc
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.06132
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.06132
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Programming.
We show the strong substitutes product-mix auction bidding language provides an intuitive and geometric interpretation of strong substitutes as Minkowski differences between sets that are easy to identify. We prove that competitive equilibrium prices