Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 47
pro vyhledávání: '"Marris, Luke"'
Normal-form games with two players, each with two strategies, are the most studied class of games. These so-called 2x2 games are used to model a variety of strategic interactions. They appear in game theory, economics, and artificial intelligence res
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.16985
Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08393
Autor:
Gemp, Ian, Lanctot, Marc, Marris, Luke, Mao, Yiran, Duéñez-Guzmán, Edgar, Perrin, Sarah, Gyorgy, Andras, Elie, Romuald, Piliouras, Georgios, Kaisers, Michael, Hennes, Daniel, Bullard, Kalesha, Larson, Kate, Bachrach, Yoram
The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has long been kn
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.03928
Autor:
Gemp, Ian, Bachrach, Yoram, Lanctot, Marc, Patel, Roma, Dasagi, Vibhavari, Marris, Luke, Piliouras, Georgios, Liu, Siqi, Tuyls, Karl
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions among rational agents. Language is a key medium of interaction for humans, though it has historically proven difficult to model dialogue and its strategic motivations mathemati
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.01704
We study computationally efficient methods for finding equilibria in n-player general-sum games, specifically ones that afford complex visuomotor skills. We show how existing methods would struggle in this setting, either computationally or in theory
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.05133
Autor:
Lanctot, Marc, Larson, Kate, Bachrach, Yoram, Marris, Luke, Li, Zun, Bhoopchand, Avishkar, Anthony, Thomas, Tanner, Brian, Koop, Anna
We argue that many general evaluation problems can be viewed through the lens of voting theory. Each task is interpreted as a separate voter, which requires only ordinal rankings or pairwise comparisons of agents to produce an overall evaluation. By
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.03121
We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximatin
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.06689
Equilibrium solution concepts of normal-form games, such as Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria, describe the joint strategy profiles from which no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate. They are widely stu
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.09978
Autor:
Goktas, Denizalp, Parkes, David C., Gemp, Ian, Marris, Luke, Piliouras, Georgios, Elie, Romuald, Lever, Guy, Tacchetti, Andrea
We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE)
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.06607
Autor:
Li, Zun, Lanctot, Marc, McKee, Kevin R., Marris, Luke, Gemp, Ian, Hennes, Daniel, Muller, Paul, Larson, Kate, Bachrach, Yoram, Wellman, Michael P.
Multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) has benefited significantly from population-based and game-theoretic training regimes. One approach, Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO), employs standard reinforcement learning to compute response policies v
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.00797