Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability: A field experiment on managing corruption in Uganda

Autor: Mark T. Buntaine, Brigham Daniels

Publikováno v: Research & Politics, Vol 7 (2020)

Citizen monitoring of government performance is often ineffective at improving performance, perhaps because information from monitoring does not make it far enough up in the chain of bureaucracy where the authority to punish public mismanagement rest

Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/de28d3e8e4814b8f839065ea158ad494

Individualized text messages about public services fail to sway voters: evidence from a field experiment on Ugandan elections

Autor: Paula M. Pickering, Mark T. Buntaine, Daniel L. Nielson, Ryan S. Jablonski

Mobile communication technologies can provide citizens access to information that is tailored to their specific circumstances. Such technologies may therefore increase citizens’ ability to vote in line with their interests and hold politicians acco

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::71251e405add20c513f82ef9fa922515
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/110536/

Adoption of community monitoring improves common pool resource management across contexts

Autor: Tara Slough, Alicia Cooperman, Mark T. Buntaine, Jacob Kopas, Louis Graham, Paul J. Ferraro, Anouk S. Rigterink, Daniel Rubenson, Ro’ee Levy, Bing Zhang, Johannes Urpelainen, Brigitte Seim, Darin Christensen, Sasha McLarty, María Bernedo Del Carpio, Francisco Alpizar Rodriguez, Cyrus Samii, Alexandra Hartman, Sabrina Eisenbarth

Publikováno v: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 118 (2021) 29
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol 118, iss 29
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 118(29)
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

Pervasive overuse and degradation of common pool resources (CPRs) is a global concern. To sustainably manage CPRs, effective governance institutions are essential. A large literature has developed to describe the institutional design features employe

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4bc11b3849376fc36c6a12de721284cb
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2015367118

Combining bottom-up monitoring and top-down accountability: A field experiment on managing corruption in Uganda

Autor: Brigham Daniels, Mark T. Buntaine

Publikováno v: Research & Politics, Vol 7 (2020)

Citizen monitoring of government performance is often ineffective at improving performance, perhaps because information from monitoring does not make it far enough up in the chain of bureaucracy where the authority to punish public mismanagement rest

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::729eccf402fc2311449ed54f23834586
https://doaj.org/article/de28d3e8e4814b8f839065ea158ad494

Non‐Governmental Monitoring of Local Governments Increases Compliance with Central Mandates: A National‐Scale Field Experiment in China

Autor: Sarah E. Anderson, Mengdi Liu, Bing Zhang, Mark T. Buntaine

Publikováno v: American Journal of Political Science, vol 63, iss 3

Author(s): Anderson, SE; Buntaine, MT; Liu, M; Zhang, B | Abstract: Central governments face compliance problems when they rely on local governments to implement policy. In authoritarian political systems, these challenges are pronounced because loca

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d64989a1d50698b82bba1420a7163382
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6ss13791