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of 67
pro vyhledávání: '"Mark Balaguer"'
Autor:
Mark Balaguer
Publikováno v:
Frontiers in Psychology, Vol 9 (2019)
This paper articulates a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian kind of free will—a kind of free will that's incompatible with both determinism and epiphenomenalism—and responds to scientific arguments against the existence of this sort of freedom. In ot
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/11d78a580d1c4da2a153e2cfc5c90285
Autor:
Mark Balaguer
A philosopher considers whether the scientific and philosophical arguments against free will are reason enough to give up our belief in it.In our daily life, it really seems as though we have free will, that what we do from moment to moment is determ
Autor:
Mark Balaguer
An argument that the problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events.In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the ph
Autor:
Mark Balaguer
This Element defends mathematical anti-realism against an underappreciated problem with that view-a problem having to do with modal truthmaking. Part I develops mathematical anti-realism, it defends that view against a number of well-known objections
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d6291ec9120ca8c89b568f9048010b3a
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009346030
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009346030
Autor:
Mark Balaguer
In this highly absorbing work, Balaguer demonstrates that no good arguments exist either for or against mathematical platonism-for example, the view that abstract mathematical objects do exist and that mathematical theories are descriptions of such o
Autor:
Mark Balaguer
Publikováno v:
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion
Chapter 3 provides a response to a worry about the non-factualist views argued for in this book—in particular, the view that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any abstract objects like numbers or physical objects like planets and ta
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0b43a4ca8fb342d9c67bd4331c16d86d
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0003
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0003
Autor:
Mark Balaguer
Publikováno v:
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion
Chapter 4 provides an argument for a non-factualist view of the composite-object question; i.e., it argues that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as composite objects like tables and rocks and cats (where a composite o
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b809f16d3f0026d20df68496097cc852
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0004
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0004
Autor:
Mark Balaguer
Publikováno v:
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion
Chapter 7 explains how the non-factualist views established in the first part of this book fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism. This chapter formulates neo-positivism, explains why neo-positivism isn’t self-refuting, and
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ce45e04f14a7bc2aa0f0f28f105e7016
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0007
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0007
Autor:
Mark Balaguer
Publikováno v:
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion
Chapter 5 provides an argument for a non-factualist view of the abstract-object question; in other words, it argues that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects like numbers and sets and propositions (whe
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d79832d82cd0d221e1f5c65d67dd44db
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0005
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0005
Autor:
Mark Balaguer
Chapter 8 argues that neo-positivists can endorse scientistic views of conceptual-analysis questions—i.e., questions like ‘What is free will?’, ‘What is a person?’, and so on. Very roughly, scientism about a question Q is the view that Q is
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c840e1ccae1650e08b8510598013663f
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0008
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0008