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pro vyhledávání: '"Marie-Sarah Lacharité"'
Publikováno v:
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, Pp 277-313 (2018)
Statistical analysis of ciphertexts has been recently used to carry out devastating inference attacks on deterministic encryption (Naveed, Kamara, and Wright, CCS 2015), order-preserving/revealing encryption (Grubbs et al., S&P 2017), and searchable
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4ceb50061e52427594dec0f338619602
Autor:
Marie-Sarah Lacharité
Publikováno v:
Cryptography and Communications
Traditional single-user security models do not necessarily capture the power of real-world attackers. A scheme that is secure in the single-user setting may not be as secure in the multi-user setting. Inspired by the recent analysis of Schnorr signat
Publikováno v:
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) 2019
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) 2019, May 2019, San Francisco, United States
2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) 2019
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) 2019, May 2019, San Francisco, United States
2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
ISBN:978-1-5386-6660-9
ISBN:978-1-5386-6660-9
Publikováno v:
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
We analyse the security of database encryption schemes supporting range queries against persistent adversaries. The bulk of our work applies to a generic setting, where the adversary's view is limited to the set of records matched by each query (know
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security-CCS 18
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security -CCS '18
CCS
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security -CCS '18
CCS
We present attacks that use only the volume of responses to range queries to reconstruct databases. Our focus is on practical attacks that work for large-scale databases with many values and records, without requiring assumptions on the data or query