Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 21
pro vyhledávání: '"Maria Romaniello"'
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 15, Iss 4, p 27 (2024)
The literature on strategic ambiguity in classical games provides generalized notions of equilibrium in which each player best responds to ambiguous or imprecise beliefs about his opponents’ strategic choices. In a recent paper, strategic ambiguity
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/13e7ead669ee44e2a9521fa096130bbb
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 120:92-106
Psychological games aim to represent situations in which players may have belief-dependent moti-vations. In this setting, utility functions are directly dependent on the entire hierarchy of beliefs of each player. On the other hand, the literature on
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods including also non- Samuelsonian public goods. For this type of economies, the notion of competitive equilibrium called cost share equilibrium is founded on individual payments for
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______3977::651c493853224121cbb49d2e7abcc804
https://hdl.handle.net/11591/488493
https://hdl.handle.net/11591/488493
Psychological games aim to represent situations in which players have belief-dependent motivations or believe that their opponents have belief-dependent motivations. In this setting, utility functions are directly dependent on the entire hierarchy of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______3977::cb0d57f3bac5085e5ec226aa78eb6353
https://hdl.handle.net/11591/488494
https://hdl.handle.net/11591/488494
Autor:
Maria Romaniello, Cristina Fasone
Publikováno v:
Executive–Legislative (Im)balance in the European Union
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0ab1dc857bf5299361eff4bbc1806f16
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509930036.ch-010
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509930036.ch-010
Autor:
Maria Romaniello, Giuseppe De Marco
Publikováno v:
Applied Mathematical Sciences. 7:4789-4800
In this paper we consider a model of games of incomplete information under ambiguity in which players are endowed with variational preferences. We provide an existence result for the corresponding mixed equilibrium notion. Then we study the limit beh
In a market model with public projects, we introduce and study von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets. Stability concepts derive from a procedure in which the blocking coalitions are responsible for a share of the total cost of the public project. Thi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9bf7382e532314abb2dc25e92192edc3
http://hdl.handle.net/11591/191894
http://hdl.handle.net/11591/191894
Autor:
Maria Romaniello, Ugo Fiore
Publikováno v:
Applied Soft Computing. 54:364-365
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 38:269-303
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods involving the choice of a public project. We discuss core-equivalence results in the general framework of non-Euclidean representation of the collective goods. We define a contribut