On the core of m-attribute games

Autor: Ulaş Özen, Marco Slikker, Greys Sošić

Publikováno v: Production and Operations Management, 31(4), 1770-1787. Wiley-Blackwell

We study a special class of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU), called (Formula presented.) -attribute games. Every player in an (Formula presented.) -attribute game is endowed with a vector of (Formula presented.) attributes that can b

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0ab10ddf802d905f56a8ee18be5f3e2c
https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/35a8dff4-798c-4bff-ada7-3a7f904f04d5

Core nonemptiness of stratified pooling games: a structured markov decision process approach

Autor: Geert-Jan van Houtum, Willem van Jaarsveld, Marco Slikker, Loe Schlicher

Publikováno v: Mathematics of Operations Research, 45(4), 1445-1465. INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences

We study several service providers that keep spare parts in stock to protect for downtime of their high-tech machines and that face different downtime costs per stockout. Service providers can cooperate by forming a joint spare parts pool, and we stu

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8a5d64ee3903148a3c023acb6934b013
https://research.tue.nl/nl/publications/b7dc3286-20fc-45bc-9e55-5c9db8e0af6e

On stability of collaborative supplier selection

Autor: Marco Slikker, Behzad Hezarkhani

Publikováno v: Operations Research Letters, 46(5), 514-517. Elsevier

This note discusses the possibility of fair gain sharing in cooperative situations where players optimally partition themselves across a number of alternative channels. An example is group purchasing among a set of buyers facing with a range of suppl

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::29571d46da950cd1920568eeb7d98833
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2018.08.002

Probabilistic resource pooling games

Autor: Loe Schlicher, Gjjan Geert-Jan van Houtum, Marco Slikker

Publikováno v: Naval Research Logistics, 64(7), 531-546. Wiley
Naval Research Logistics, 64(7), 531-546. New York: Wiley, in coop. with the Office of Naval Research

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each asso- ciated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player-specific costs. Players can cooperate by realloc

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1964aa6b6a8b1c551150063a531500d2
https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.21776

A selfish allocation heuristic in scheduling: equilibrium and inefficiency bound analysis

Autor: Jac Braat, Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn, Marco Slikker

Publikováno v: European Journal of Operational Research, 273(2), 634-645. Elsevier
European Journal of Operational Research, 273(2), 634-645. Elsevier Science BV
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
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For single decision maker optimization problems that lack time efficient algorithms to determine the optimum, there is a need for heuristics. In the context of coordinated production planning, the seminal paper of Graham (1969) provided a performance

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e957167d7d63c698162b27aa6a7c8abc
https://research.tue.nl/nl/publications/30ae2291-7bdf-4565-a476-06dd555e978d