Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 30
pro vyhledávání: '"Marco Pagnozzi"'
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review. 111:3256-3298
We explore how taste projection—the tendency to overestimate how similar others’ tastes are to one’s own—affects bidding in auctions. In first-price auctions with private values, taste projection leads bidders to exaggerate the intensity of c
A manufacturer chooses the optimal retail market structure and bilaterally and secretly contracts with each (homogeneous) retailer. In a classic framework without asymmetric information, the manufacturer sells through a single exclusive retailer in o
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d350af4b2eedb8fd92fd0204cb48ee5b
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/865037
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/865037
Autor:
Marco Pagnozzi, Krista Jabs Saral
Publikováno v:
The Economic Journal. 127:2702-2729
We analyze the effects of different resale mechanisms on bidders’ strategies in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. Our experimental design consists of four treatments: one without resale and three resale treatments that va
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Industrial Economics. 64:520-556
We study a model where an endogenous number of competing manufacturers located around a circle contract with exclusive retailers who are privately informed about their costs. The number of brands in the market (determined by the manufacturers’ zero
Autor:
Marco Pagnozzi, Krista Jabs Saral
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2019, 159, pp.51-74. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2019.01.011⟩
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2019, 159, pp.51-74. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2019.01.011⟩
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2019, 159, pp.51-74. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2019.01.011⟩
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2019, 159, pp.51-74. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2019.01.011⟩
In auctions where bidders are uncertain of their value and are fully liable for their bids, there exists the potential for losses if bids exceed realized values. Theoretically, bids will be higher if bidders are able to mitigate this downside loss th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b575d153cbe26dd6123e51a6f67ed6d4
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02010914
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02010914
Autor:
Marco Pagnozzi, Krista Jabs Saral
Publikováno v:
Experimental Economics
Experimental Economics, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2019, 22 (2), pp. 477-505. ⟨10.1007/s10683-018-9564-5⟩
Experimental Economics, 2019, 22 (2), pp. 477-505. ⟨10.1007/s10683-018-9564-5⟩
Experimental Economics, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2019, 22 (2), pp. 477-505. ⟨10.1007/s10683-018-9564-5⟩
Experimental Economics, 2019, 22 (2), pp. 477-505. ⟨10.1007/s10683-018-9564-5⟩
We experimentally analyze the role of speculators, who have no use value for the objects on sale, in auctions. The environment is a uniform-price sealed-bid auction for 2 identical objects, followed by a free-form bargaining resale market, with one p
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d49b1eed70b7779ef950dbdd7c16be3b
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/702892
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/702892
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 24:904-933
We revisit the choice of product differentiation in the Hotelling model, by assuming that competing firms are vertically separated, and that retailers choose products' characteristics. The “principle of differentiation” does not hold because reta
Internal agency conflicts distort firms' choices and reduce social welfare. To limit these distortions, principals dealing with privately informed agents often acquire information from specialized intermediaries, such as auditing and certification co
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0b564e130fa2be29b992cdc1e96c976f
http://hdl.handle.net/10446/145173
http://hdl.handle.net/10446/145173
Autor:
Salvatore Piccolo, Marco Pagnozzi
We analyze entry in markets where a principal contracts with a privately informed agent. Before learning his production cost, the agent knows his probability of having a low cost --- his ex ante "type" --- and decides whether to pay an entry fee to c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d08ed5c6c82d7162d7a415ee8aff075a
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/662231
http://hdl.handle.net/11588/662231