Výsledky vyhledávání - "Marco Facchin"

Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being)

Autor: Marco Facchin

Publikováno v: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences. 4

Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions identifying all instances of cognition. They claim that the mark of the cognitive is needed to steer the development of cognitiv

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::be93f94f77b6e91cec7abd2687e4ffbf
https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9664

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Predictive processing and anti-representationalism

Autor: Marco Facchin

Publikováno v: Synthese. 199:11609-11642

Many philosophers claim that the neurocomputational framework of predictive processing entails a globally inferentialist and representationalist view of cognition. Here, I contend that this is not correct. I argue that, given the theoretical commitme

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::02e60ddd9daccd5cb72cca731028cbbb
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03304-3

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Phenomenal transparency, cognitive extension, and predictive processing

Autor: Marco Facchin

Publikováno v: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::03dcf51db24538e269d430a9e5ee7061
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09831-9

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Are Generative Models Structural Representations?

Autor: Marco Facchin

Publikováno v: Minds and Machines. 31:277-303

Philosophers interested in the theoretical consequences of predictive processing often assume that predictive processing is an inferentialist and representationalist theory of cognition. More specifically, they assume that predictive processing revol

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1076d4159ef4959bf76dc98b3d7a2c77
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-021-09559-6

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Is radically enactive imagination really contentless?

Autor: Marco Facchin

Publikováno v: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 21:1089-1105

Radical enactivists claim that cognition is split in two distinct kinds, which can be differentiated by how they relate to mental content. In their view, basic cognitive activities involve no mental content whatsoever, whereas linguistically scaffold

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ebda3be7991ba4a630cea0f8707a8ce1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09721-y

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There is no 'inference within a model'

Autor: Marco Facchin

Publikováno v: Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 45

I argue that there is no viable development of the instrumentalist inference within a model research program. I further argue that both Friston and Pearl blankets are not the right sort of tool to settle debates on philosophical internalism and exter

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::05ddf2386e44d399adc946d6c3e21752
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x22000085

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Retiring the 'Cinderella view': the spinal cord as an intrabodily cognitive extension

Autor: Marco Facchin, Marco Viola, Elia Zanin

Publikováno v: Biology & Philosophy. 36

Within the field of neuroscience, it is assumed that the central nervous system is divided into two functionally distinct components: the brain, which does the cognizing, and the spinal cord, which is a conduit of information enabling the brain to do

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a296aa284bcb8e6ecb8ae8f0a22d95d8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-021-09822-1

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