Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 11
pro vyhledávání: '"Marco Buso"'
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 30:721-742
We study the effects of granting an exit option that enables the private party to early terminate a PPP project if it turns out to be financially loss-making. In a continuous-time setting with hidden information about operating profits, we show that
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::554a986ecdbf78ec65e845148424cd8a
https://hdl.handle.net/11577/3395336
https://hdl.handle.net/11577/3395336
We study the optimal design of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) when there is unobservable action on the private party's side. We show that if the private party does not have negotiating power over the project's surplus, then no inefficient delays
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::da3ee75346cad087306f28466f3eedb7
http://hdl.handle.net/10807/201641
http://hdl.handle.net/10807/201641
Smart grids are often considered a cornerstone of energy transition and market liberalization in electric industries. From a critical reading of the interdisciplinary academic and governmental literature, we draw a new definition of grid smartness th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7327493240a4d4c171f48352827a4bb2
http://hdl.handle.net/10807/170997
http://hdl.handle.net/10807/170997
Autor:
Marco Buso
This paper addresses the benefits of bundling two sequential activities in the context of public–private partnerships (PPPs). The paper introduces a source of asymmetric information in the form of an externality parameter that links the building st
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::30f8d80190e8cb68b360c082fb2c0d8b
https://hdl.handle.net/11577/3472181
https://hdl.handle.net/11577/3472181
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, In press, pp.1-52. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12358⟩
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2020, 22 (3), pp.769-820. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12358⟩
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2020, 22 (3), pp.769-820. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12358⟩
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, In press, pp.1-52. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12358⟩
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2020, 22 (3), pp.769-820. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12358⟩
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2020, 22 (3), pp.769-820. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12358⟩
In this paper we first develop a theoretical model characterized by sequential activities (initial investment and management effort) and moral hazard. The game is an interaction between two agents: the first is in charge of the two tasks that imply a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::735410ccf223f8db5fca5fec21b28850
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02398654
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02398654
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study the effects of granting an exit option that enables the private party to early terminate a PPP project if it turns out to be loss-making. In a continuous time setting with hidden information about stochastic operating profits, we show that a
Autor:
Anne Stenger, Marco Buso
Publikováno v:
Energy Policy
Energy Policy, Elsevier, 2018, 119, pp.487-494. ⟨10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.063⟩
Energy Policy, Elsevier, 2018, 119, pp.487-494. ⟨10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.063⟩
The negative impacts of climate change on the environment and economic activities are increasingly obvious and relevant. Private response to this threat often proves to be inadequate. For example, empirical evidence reveals a sub-optimal investment b
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bd5423b3c3067adb5b349a5b1361d5e7
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01952098
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01952098