Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 45
pro vyhledávání: '"Marc Uetz"'
Publikováno v:
International transactions in operational research, 29(6), 3346-3369. Blackwell Publishing
In this paper, we study a framework of weighted hypergraph communication situations, in which each hyperlink is interpreted as a conference and the same players may have different weights in different conferences. Since common players play an interme
Publikováno v:
Journal of Scheduling, 25(5), 503-505. Springer
Journal of scheduling, 25(5), 503-505. Springer
Journal of Scheduling, 25(5), 503-505
Operations Research Letters, 50(3). Elsevier
Operations research letters, 50(3). Elsevier
Journal of scheduling, 25(5), 503-505. Springer
Journal of Scheduling, 25(5), 503-505
Operations Research Letters, 50(3). Elsevier
Operations research letters, 50(3). Elsevier
Gerhard Woeginger has passed away. His colleagues Jan Karel Lenstra, Franz Rendl, Frits Spieksma and Marc Uetz commemorate a great scientist and dear friend.
Publikováno v:
OR Spectrum, 45. Springer
This paper proposes an alternative for the two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structure that has earlier been proposed by Kamijo. The value is based on the idea that within a union of players, worth should be distributed base
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e91eacb0ec7b07116736e1cef7d6bb55
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/148de47a-9817-4b16-a9e0-36470148601e
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/148de47a-9817-4b16-a9e0-36470148601e
Publikováno v:
Mathematics of operations research, 46(3), 1230-1234. INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
This corrigendum fixes an incorrect claim in the paper Gupta et al. [Gupta V, Moseley B, Uetz M, Xie Q (2020) Greed works—online algorithms for unrelated machine stochastic scheduling. Math. Oper. Res. 45(2):497–516.], which led us to claim a per
Publikováno v:
Annals of operations research, 302(2), 341-362. Springer
In this paper we propose a two-phase approach to solve the shift and break design problem using integer linear programming. In the first phase we create the shifts, while heuristically taking the breaks into account. In the second phase we assign bre
Autor:
Jasper de Jong, Marc Uetz
Publikováno v:
International journal of game theory, 49, 321-344. Springer
We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which n selfish players select disjoint subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this basic class of games. Special attention is
Autor:
Jasper de Jong, Marc Uetz
Publikováno v:
Operations research letters, 47(2), 133-139. Elsevier
This paper determines the sequential price of anarchy for Rosenthal congestion games with affine cost functions and few players. We show that for two players, the sequential price of anarchy equals 1.5, and for three players it equals 1039 ∕ 488
Publikováno v:
Operations research letters, 48(4), 428-434. Elsevier
This paper extends sequencing games as introduced by Curiel et al. (1989) to the setting with a position-dependent learning effect. We show that these games are balanced, and analyze the family of equal gains sharing (EGS) rules. In contrast to games
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::801e293b1e997c86445703da31a6a6ff
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/7e541efd-e79f-4b6c-a51a-bf20ce302589
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/7e541efd-e79f-4b6c-a51a-bf20ce302589
Publikováno v:
Mathematics of operations research, 45(2), 497-516. INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
This paper establishes performance guarantees for online algorithms that schedule stochastic, nonpreemptive jobs on unrelated machines to minimize the expected total weighted completion time. Prior work on unrelated machine scheduling with stochastic
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ef40b7e4ad6add8511d699ae503c87a5
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/36f11f56-0538-4b16-b70c-32519e4a4bf0
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/36f11f56-0538-4b16-b70c-32519e4a4bf0
Publikováno v:
Correa, J R, Jong, J D, Keijzer, B D & Uetz, M 2019, ' The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network Routing ', MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, vol. 44, no. 4, C2, pp. 1286-1303 . https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0968
Mathematics of operations research, 44(4), 1286-1303. INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
Mathematics of operations research, 44(4), 1286-1303. INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
This paper provides new bounds on the quality of equilibria in finite congestion games with affine cost functions, specifically for atomic network routing games. It is well known that the price of anarchy equals exactly 5/2 in general. For symmetric
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4bcd280fb654b075d4b13330fec6905f
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/files/146293058/The_Inefficiency_of_Nash_CORREA_Acc23Aug2018_GREEN_AAM.pdf
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/files/146293058/The_Inefficiency_of_Nash_CORREA_Acc23Aug2018_GREEN_AAM.pdf