Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 11
pro vyhledávání: '"M. J. Albizuri"'
Autor:
A. Goikoetxea, M. J. Albizuri
Publikováno v:
Group Decision and Negotiation. 30:1027-1055
Inspired by Owen’s (Nav Res Logist Quart 18:345–354, 1971) previous work on the subject, Shapley (A comparison of power indices and a non-symmetric generalization. Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1977) introduced the Owen–Shapley spatial power
Publikováno v:
Group Decision and Negotiation. 27:153-163
A non-cooperative approach is employed to solve the problem of allocating the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users. More precisely, it is proposed a non-cooperative bargaining game with a unique subgame perfect equ
Publikováno v:
Annals of Operations Research. 235:1-11
In this paper we address the question of how to allocate the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users based on a non-cooperative approach. We present a non-cooperative bargaining game with a unique Nash equilibrium out
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 60:144-148
We reexamine the consistency axiom in bankruptcy problems and propose arguments in favor of an alternative definition of a reduced problem. The classical definition updates the size of the estate while keeping agents' claims unaffected. Instead, we s
Autor:
M. J. Albizuri, José Manuel Zarzuelo
Publikováno v:
Discrete Mathematics. 309(16):4969-4976
In this work we analyze consistency for allocation rules in communication situations. More precisely we characterize the rules proposed by Myerson [R.B. Myerson, Graphs and cooperation in games, Math. Oper. Res. 2, 1977, 225–229; R.B. Myerson, Conf
Autor:
M. J. Albizuri
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision. 69:555-567
In this study, we present a cost-sharing rule for cost-sharing problems. This rule prescribes the same allocations in a problem and in its dual one. Moreover, in some specific problems it gives the same allocations as the serial cost-sharing rule (Mo
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 57:1-17
It is proposed an extension of the Owen's coalitional value so as to consider the possibility that players organize themselves in coalitions that are not necessarily disjoint. This extension is made through a random order approach. To complement this
Publikováno v:
International Game Theory Review. :63-72
Lucas and Trall (1963) defined the games in partition function form as a generalization of the cooperative games with transferable utility. In our work we propose by means of an axiomatic characterization a solution for such games in partition functi
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 31:437-446
In this paper we study a solution for discrete cost allocation problems, namely, the serial cost sharing method. We show that this solution can be computed by applying the Shapley value to an appropriate TU game and we present a probabilistic formula
Autor:
M. J. Albizuri
In this paper we provide a characterization for the modified Banzhaf-Coleman indexes by employing some amalgamation axioms as Lehrer (1988) did for the Banzhaf-Coleman indexes.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3be32de00fadcbe6f90b2ec125bb4cac
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/1030002/10300167.pdf
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/1030002/10300167.pdf