Výsledky vyhledávání - "M G Fiestras-Janeiro"

Sampling methods to estimate the Banzhaf–Owen value

Autor: M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, Alejandro Saavedra-Nieves

Publikováno v: Annals of Operations Research. 301:199-223

This paper addresses two sampling methods to estimate the Banzhaf–Owen value for general cooperative games. The first approach is based on simple random sampling without replacement of those coalitions that are compatible with the system of unions.

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::17d829f3736493b138a79c367c9d4ce4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03614-8

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On convexity in cooperative games with externalities

Autor: Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, Andrés Jiménez-Losada, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, José Mª Alonso-Meijide

Publikováno v: Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona

We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the m

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8feb103bc1f2abf663d5871eb5ce736c
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/187819

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On benefits of cooperation under strategic power

Autor: M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, Ana Meca, Manuel A. Mosquera, Ignacio García-Jurado

Publikováno v: Annals of Operations Research. 288:285-306

We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the p

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::97dc0f23bb2be82f3a716bf9960d9d53
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6

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Complete null agent for games with externalities

Autor: M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, Andrés Jiménez-Losada, José María Alonso-Meijide, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos

Publikováno v: Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname

Game theory provides valuable tools to examine expert multi-agent systems. In a cooperative game, collaboration among agents leads to better outcomes. The most important solution for such games is the Shapley value, that coincides with the expected m

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e92687eec28de234486b56baf87c9a48
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2019.05.056

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Marginality and convexity in partition function form games

Autor: Andrés Jiménez-Losada, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, José Mª Alonso-Meijide, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos

Publikováno v: Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
instname
idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla

In this paper an order on the set of embedded coalitions is studied in detail. This allows us to define new notions of superaddivity and convexity of games in partition function form which are compared to other proposals in the literature. The main r

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::dc27368b3db7e32fa5db372006880e74
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/180174

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Sampling methods to estimate the Banzhaf-Owen value

Autor: A Saavedra-Nieves, M G Fiestras-Janeiro

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dc2aa45e27a432ee809adeb4d614bda7

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A precedence constraint value revisited

Autor: M. Schuster, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, E. Sánchez-Rodríguez

Publikováno v: TOP. 24:156-179

This paper discusses games where cooperation is restricted by a hierarchical structure. The model assumes that there is a hierarchy between certain coalitions given by a partition. Face games (Gonzalez-Diaz and Sanchez-Rodriguez in Games Econ Behav 6

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::16381e3f0598174efb41f3e6e1163bbf
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-015-0380-1

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$$k$$ k -core covers and the core

Autor: M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, Manuel A. Mosquera, Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez, Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Peter Borm

Publikováno v: Sanchez-Rodriguez, E, Borm, P, Estevez Fernandez, M A, Fiestras-Janeiro, M G & Mosquera, M A 2015, ' k-core covers and the core ', Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, vol. 81, no. 2, pp. 147-167 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-014-0490-9
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Universidade de Vigo (UVigo)
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 81(2), 147-167. Physica-Verlag
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 81(2), 147-167. SPRINGER HEIDELBERG

This paper extends the notion of individual minimal rights for a transferable utility game (TU-game) to coalitional minimal rights using minimal balanced families of a specific type, thus defining a corresponding minimal rights game. It is shown that

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::209cdee9fda6b7389a339bd22e916d86
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-014-0490-9

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On the externality free shapley-shubik index

Autor: Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, José María Alonso-Meijide, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro

Publikováno v: Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname

We address the problem of extending the Shapley–Shubik index to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) . On the one hand, we provide bounds for any efficient, symmetric, and monotonic power index. On

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7a224a87de992ce4a29b524a1847e77c
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115651

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On the 1-nucleolus

Autor: Peter Borm, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, Manuel A. Mosquera, Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez

Publikováno v: Estevez Fernandez, M A, Borm, P, Fiestras-Janeiro, M G, Mosquera, M A & Sánchez-Rodríguez, E 2017, ' On the 1-nucleolus ', Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 309-329 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-017-0597-x
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 86(2), 309-329. Physica-Verlag
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 86(2), 309-329. SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo
Universidade de Vigo (UVigo)

This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus. It is seen that, contrary to the nucleolus, the 1-nucleolus can be computed in polynomial time due to a characterization using a combination of standard bankruptcy

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7dad75c7fc4dff5cebfa7b3f5ba0cdf5
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/6ef38487-0ec5-4946-bf05-acc22ceb035f

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