Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 3 800
pro vyhledávání: '"Lucier A"'
In online combinatorial allocations/auctions, n bidders sequentially arrive, each with a combinatorial valuation (such as submodular/XOS) over subsets of m indivisible items. The aim is to immediately allocate a subset of the remaining items to maxim
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.11091
We present several advancements in search-type problems for fleets of mobile agents operating in two dimensions under the wireless model. Potential hidden target locations are equidistant from a central point, forming either a disk (infinite possible
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.19495
We consider a principal seller with $m$ heterogeneous products to sell to an additive buyer over independent items. The principal can offer an arbitrary menu of product bundles, but faces competition from smaller and more agile single-item sellers. T
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.13835
Traditionally, AI has been modeled within economics as a technology that impacts payoffs by reducing costs or refining information for human agents. Our position is that, in light of recent advances in generative AI, it is increasingly useful to mode
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.00477
We study the problem of a principal who wants to influence an agent's observable action, subject to an ex-post budget. The agent has a private type determining their cost function. This paper endogenizes the value of the resource driving incentives,
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.15531
We introduce a model of online algorithms subject to strict constraints on data retention. An online learning algorithm encounters a stream of data points, one per round, generated by some stationary process. Crucially, each data point can request th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.10997
When deployed in the world, a learning agent such as a recommender system or a chatbot often repeatedly interacts with another learning agent (such as a user) over time. In many such two-agent systems, each agent learns separately and the rewards of
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.00188
We study a Bayesian persuasion game where a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take a binary action, such as purchasing a product. The sender is informed about the (binary) state of the world, such as whether the quality of the product is high or
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.18138
We study a game played between advertisers in an online ad platform. The platform sells ad impressions by first-price auction and provides autobidding algorithms that optimize bids on each advertiser's behalf, subject to advertiser constraints such a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.07374
Motivated by applications such as voluntary carbon markets and educational testing, we consider a market for goods with varying but hidden levels of quality in the presence of a third-party certifier. The certifier can provide informative signals abo
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13449