Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 53
pro vyhledávání: '"Lu, Xinhang"'
We study the problem of fairly allocating either a set of indivisible goods or a set of mixed divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods) to agents with additive utilities, taking the best-of-both-worlds perspective of guaranteeing fairness p
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.06877
We study the allocation of indivisible goods that form an undirected graph and investigate the worst-case welfare loss when requiring that each agent must receive a connected subgraph. Our focus is on both egalitarian and utilitarian welfare. Specifi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.03467
In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To ad
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.05198
We study the efficiency of fair allocations using the well-studied price of fairness concept, which quantitatively measures the worst-case efficiency loss when imposing fairness constraints. Previous works provided partial results on the price of fai
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.01516
The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of the resourc
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.00976
Publikováno v:
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), 80:1373-1406, 2024
Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and ar
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.09564
We study the problem of designing truthful and fair mechanisms when allocating a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods. We first show that there does not exist an EFM (envy-free for mixed goods) and truthful mechanism in general. This impossibil
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.09206
The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.03642
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare, 62(4):643-677 (2024)
We consider a voting scenario in which the resource to be voted upon may consist of both indivisible and divisible goods. This setting generalizes both the well-studied model of multiwinner voting and the recently introduced model of cake sharing. Un
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2211.12647
The classic cake cutting problem concerns the fair allocation of a heterogeneous resource among interested agents. In this paper, we study a public goods variant of the problem, where instead of competing with one another for the cake, the agents all
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2112.05632