Zobrazeno 1 - 5
of 5
pro vyhledávání: '"Lorenzo Bastianello"'
Publikováno v:
Economic theory. 74(2)
A group of experts, for instance climate scientists, is to choose among two policies $f$ and $g$. Consider the following decision rule. If all experts agree that the expected utility of $f$ is higher than the expected utility of $g$, the unanimity ru
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::198942934a3859b5d2596267267a9b84
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35669354
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35669354
Autor:
Marco LiCalzi, Lorenzo Bastianello
Publikováno v:
Econometrica
We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and u
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c1a073002745f7e89c1d6b14b37e8c80
Autor:
Lorenzo Bastianello
A decision maker is to choose between two different amounts of money, with the smaller one available at an earlier period. Then she is long-term delay averse if she chooses the smaller and earlier extra amount whenever the bigger one is delivered suf
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c8e9d68fcd2f868874a6542f4329048b
http://hdl.handle.net/10278/5003358
http://hdl.handle.net/10278/5003358
Autor:
Lorenzo Bastianello, Alain Chateauneuf
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2016, 63, pp.62-77. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.12.006⟩
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2016, 63, pp.62-77. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.12.006⟩
International audience; In this paper, we study the behaviour of decision makers who show preferences for advancing the timing of future satisfaction. We give two definitions that are representative of this kind of attitude and investigate their impl
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f60b0ce1855253f139d053ae2f9bec67
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01302543
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01302543
Autor:
Lorenzo Bastianello, Marco LiCalzi
We revisit the Nash model for two-person bargaining. A mediator knows agents' ordinal preferences over feasible proposals, but has incomplete information about their acceptance thresholds. We provide a behavioural characterisation under which the med
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::87d59d9373f016ec97a46d936de56bcb
http://virgo.unive.it/wpideas/storage/2015wp05.pdf
http://virgo.unive.it/wpideas/storage/2015wp05.pdf