Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 29
pro vyhledávání: '"Lorenczik, Stefan"'
Autor:
Jorquera-Copier, Javier, Lorca, Álvaro, Sauma, Enzo, Lorenczik, Stefan, Negrete-Pincetic, Matías
Publikováno v:
In Energy Policy January 2024 184
Publikováno v:
In Energy Economics January 2021 93
Publikováno v:
In European Journal of Operational Research 16 January 2017 256(2):605-618
Publikováno v:
In Energy Economics January 2016 53:118-131
Autor:
McCoy, Sean, Bertsch, Joachim, Growitsch, Christian, Lorenczik, Stefan, Nagl, Stephan, Volk, Dennis, Finkenrath, Matthias, Davison, John
Publikováno v:
In Energy Procedia 2013 37:2665-2675
There is an ongoing debate on the appropriate auction design for competitive electricity balancing markets. Uniform (UPA)and discriminatory price auctions (DPA), the prevalent designs in use today, are assumed to have different properties with regard
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::760104a81cae8e234b91ff9b42a1c66f
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/203683
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/203683
Autor:
Lorenczik, Stefan
The thesis at hand consists of four essays which are divided into two parts. In the first part, consisting of the first two essays, market design issues in electricity markets are discussed. More precisely, it deals with concerns regarding security o
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______199::b056413924838be508f1fb1305c5c989
https://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/7896/
https://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/7896/
Autor:
Lorenczik, Stefan, Panke, Timo
The prevalent market structures found in many resource markets consist of a high concentration on the supply side and a low demand elasticity. Market results are therefore frequently assumed to be an outcome of strategic interaction between producers
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::04ef932cb5a24abc6fe2f125d3b52623
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/115000
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/115000