Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 11
pro vyhledávání: '"Lionel Richefort"'
Autor:
Pauline Pedehour, Lionel Richefort
Publikováno v:
Environmental and Resource Economics. 82:625-655
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::786934f09ed41473a102cfcccd90e0f8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00676-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00676-z
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::052fc9af6e6251d4db5c8d707108f128
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3895125
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3895125
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2020, 22 (5), pp.1368-1390. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12442⟩
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2020, 22 (5), pp.1368-1390. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12442⟩
This paper explores a model of group membership formation in which agents decide to join or not multiple social groups. The membership formation process induces a bipartite graph structure with social groups listed on one side and agents listed on th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::daf5f79e83e26dd8f6c80cd1bca91ca3
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03193647
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03193647
Autor:
Lionel Richefort
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 47:1211-1238
This paper explores a voluntary contribution game in the presence of warm-glow effects. There are many public goods and each public good benefits a different group of players. The structure of the game induces a bipartite network structure, where pla
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fb7c01b5657fb3e8582c8e38e335cf6b
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0616-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0616-z
Autor:
Lionel Richefort
Publikováno v:
Revue d’Économie Régionale & Urbaine. (1):109-130
L’objet de ce papier est d’identifier et de conceptualiser les facteurs explicatifs de la diffusion de technologies d’irrigation economes en eau a l’ile de la Reunion. Une enquete aupres de 116 irrigants combinee a une revue de la litterature
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::03ce2a5317667fd8a6490f226f10219e
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RERU_081_0109
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RERU_081_0109
Autor:
Yann Rébillé, Lionel Richefort
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4a0b280ab5efdcb8053d55d22d7f8863
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01074708
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01074708
Autor:
Lionel Richefort, Yann Rébillé
A directed network game of imperfect strategic substitutes with heterogeneous players is analyzed. We consider concave additive separable utility functions that encompass the quasi-linear ones. It is found that pure strategy Nash equilibria verify a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5f777ef53296b529743d92df4acfdeb0
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00732962/document
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00732962/document
Autor:
Yann Rébillé, Lionel Richefort
A local public goods game in weighted and directed networks is analyzed. Individual efforts are imperfect substitutes, players' preferences are heterogeneous and local externalities are non-uniform and asymmetric. Sufficient conditions under which th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::9c3592962ce8c0b609f16ce7e5c45bd4
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00671555/file/LEMNA_WP_201204.pdf
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00671555/file/LEMNA_WP_201204.pdf
Autor:
Marie-Estelle Binet, Lionel Richefort
Publikováno v:
Applied Economics Letters
Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles, 2010, 18 (1), pp.43-48. ⟨10.1080/13504850903425025⟩
3èmes Journées de recherches en sciences sociales, Montpellier, France, 09 au 11 décembre 2009
Applied Economics Letters, 2010, 18 (1), pp.43-48. ⟨10.1080/13504850903425025⟩
Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles, 2010, 18 (1), pp.43-48. ⟨10.1080/13504850903425025⟩
3èmes Journées de recherches en sciences sociales, Montpellier, France, 09 au 11 décembre 2009
Applied Economics Letters, 2010, 18 (1), pp.43-48. ⟨10.1080/13504850903425025⟩
International audience; We develop a conceptual framework designed to assess the impact of public incentives on the diffusion process of modern, water-saving irrigation technologies. Diffusion patterns of the integral sprinkler cover system in the su
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d13d449a15ad0e58382ffbcffcd72523
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00537701
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00537701
Autor:
Lionel Richefort, Jean-Louis Fusillier
Publikováno v:
Périodiques Scientifiques en Édition Électronique.
This article presents a theoretical framework that uses an epidemic diffusion model and a rational choice model to conceptualize the decision to adopt a given technology. We estimate both models on a sample of 114 farmers in Reunion Island. The resul
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3fb141dd39c455d9340d836e36d18477
https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_2010_num_193_2_8034
https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_2010_num_193_2_8034