Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 27
pro vyhledávání: '"Liljestrand, Hans"'
Outsourced computation presents a risk to the confidentiality of clients' sensitive data since they have to trust that the service providers will not mishandle this data. Blinded Memory (BliMe) is a set of hardware extensions that addresses this prob
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.15302
Autor:
Nasahl, Pascal, Sultana, Salmin, Liljestrand, Hans, Grewal, Karanvir, LeMay, Michael, Durham, David M., Schrammel, David, Mangard, Stefan
Fault attacks enable adversaries to manipulate the control-flow of security-critical applications. By inducing targeted faults into the CPU, the software's call graph can be escaped and the control-flow can be redirected to arbitrary functions inside
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13760
Modern processors include high-performance cryptographic functionalities such as Intel's AES-NI and ARM's Pointer Authentication that allow programs to efficiently authenticate data held by the program. Pointer Authentication is already used to prote
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.11340
Outsourced computing is widely used today. However, current approaches for protecting client data in outsourced computing fall short: use of cryptographic techniques like fully-homomorphic encryption incurs substantial costs, whereas use of hardware-
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2204.09649
Hardware-assisted memory protection features are increasingly being deployed in COTS processors. ARMv8.5 Memory Tagging Extensions (MTE) is a recent example, which has been used to provide probabilistic checks for memory safety. This use of MTE is no
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2204.03781
Software control flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been applied to the Linux kernel for memory protection. Due to performance costs, deployed software CFI solutions are coarse grained. In this work, we demonstrate a precise hardware-assisted kernel
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1912.04145
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1909.05747
A popular run-time attack technique is to compromise the control-flow integrity of a program by modifying function return addresses on the stack. So far, shadow stacks have proven to be essential for comprehensively preventing return address manipula
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1905.10242
Autor:
Cheng, Long, Liljestrand, Hans, Nyman, Thomas, Lee, Yu Tsung, Yao, Danfeng, Jaeger, Trent, Asokan, N.
Data-oriented attacks manipulate non-control data to alter a program's benign behavior without violating its control-flow integrity. It has been shown that such attacks can cause significant damage even in the presence of control-flow defense mechani
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1902.08359
Akademický článek
Tento výsledek nelze pro nepřihlášené uživatele zobrazit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.