Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 56
pro vyhledávání: '"Lilian Bermejo-Luque"'
Publikováno v:
Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofia (2023)
According to political minimalism, a debate is considered political when it revolves around the question “What shall we do?” This account suggests that certain issues related to human enhancement technologies (HETs), which have traditionally been
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/fb1576c5fc5b4460a3920f3a756493e7
Autor:
Lilian Bermejo-Luque, Andrei Moldovan
Publikováno v:
Informal Logic, Vol 41, Iss 3 (2021)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/c68ae7fa4874485a813c412b8a2a558b
Autor:
Lilian Bermejo-Luque
Publikováno v:
Informal Logic, Vol 40, Iss 3 (2020)
In “Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke’s Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism,” David Godden (2005) distinguished two notions of deductivism. On the one hand, as an interpretative thesis, deductivism is the view that
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/29eef2f8072a4fb1a41de7889611e55e
Autor:
Lilian Bermejo-Luque
Publikováno v:
Informal Logic, Vol 39, Iss 2 (2019)
I argue that conductions are a special type of inference indeed, but that this does not mean that we need to develop novel standards of inference goodness or specific argument schemes for properly assessing them. Following LNMA’s theoretical framew
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4572f711046c4f5a851c99c36961d931
Autor:
Lilian Bermejo-Luque
Publikováno v:
Informal Logic, Vol 36, Iss 1, Pp 1-25 (2016)
I argue for the distinction between presuming that p and maintaining that presumably p. In order to make sense of this distinction, I defend a non-inferentialist conception of presumptions and offer an account of the correctness conditions for both p
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/cbbefa0c8dac4209b5a34d985d263ed5
Autor:
Lilian Bermejo-Luque
Publikováno v:
Informal Logic, Vol 34, Iss 3, Pp 311-336 (2014)
a recent paper, Fábio Perin Shecaira (2013) proposes a defence of Waller’s deductivist schema for moral analogical argumentation. This defence has several flaws, the most important of them being that many good analogical arguments would be deemed
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/951a42c85c7d474cb8179892df33e3a6
Autor:
Lilian Bermejo-Luque
Publikováno v:
Informal Logic, Vol 32, Iss 1, Pp 1-24 (2012)
Following a Toulmian account of argument analysis and evaluation, I offer a general unitary schema for, so called, deductive and inductive types of analogical arguments. This schema is able to explain why certain analogical arguments can be said to b
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/88b03cce98b04666b49f330fb6f6cc4d
Autor:
Lilian Bermejo-Luque
Publikováno v:
Theoria, Vol 26, Iss 3, Pp 273-277 (2011)
In Giving Reasons: A Linguistic-pragmatic-approach to Argumentation Theory (Springer, 2011), I provide a new model for the semantic and pragmatic appraisal of argumentation. This model is based on a characterization of argumentation as a second order
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/2d4fcbfad72a43d2bf7146bfab1eaa7a
Autor:
Lilian Bermejo-Luque
Publikováno v:
Theoria, Vol 26, Iss 3, Pp 329-343 (2011)
I provide responses to what I take to be the most salient aspects of John Biro, James Freeman, David Hitchcock, Robert Pinto, Harvey Siegel and Luis Vega’s criticisms to the normative model for argumentation that I have developed in Giving Reasons.
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/7e06dfbb7f20467cae9a1d8013aba045
Publikováno v:
Theoria, Vol 26, Iss 2, Pp 195-212 (2011)
El uso de analogías en bioética es muy frecuente. Dado que son instrumentos especialmente eficaces desde un punto de vista retórico, resulta fundamental determinar bajo qué condiciones la formulación de analogías constituye un recurso discursiv
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/b2d2182a1f904a16993bfbc8a670e0d0