Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 17
pro vyhledávání: '"Liangcong Fan"'
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 4, Iss 1, Pp 89-105 (2013)
We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MP
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/a84be407bd2b4f2b825202a4bbda2566
Publikováno v:
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. 19
Corrupt deals are commonly arranged by intermediaries. However, attempts to deter corruption pay little attention to the role of intermediaries in corrupt deals. This paper reports a laboratory bribery experiment on corruption designed to investigate
Autor:
Zechun Ying, Qingshan Xu, Ying Ge, Baojing Gu, Weidong Luo, Jie Chang, Steffanie Scott, Liangcong Fan
Publikováno v:
Environmental Science and Pollution Research. 23:20360-20367
Technological innovation is one of the potential engines to mitigate environmental pollution. However, the implementation of new technologies sometimes fails owing to socioeconomic constraints from different stakeholders. Thus, it is essential to ana
Autor:
Liangcong Fan, Hongbin Liu, Baojing Gu, Shu Kee Lam, Xinchao Zhang, Lu Liu, Zechun Ying, Yuemei Yuan
Publikováno v:
Environmental science and pollution research international. 26(1)
Agricultural non-point source pollution causes global warming and the deterioration of air and water quality. It is difficult to identify and monitor the emission sources of agricultural pollution due to the large number of farms in China. Many studi
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 4, Iss 1, Pp 89-105 (2013)
Games
Volume 4
Issue 1
Pages 89-105
Games
Volume 4
Issue 1
Pages 89-105
We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MP
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We revisit intergroup prejudice by distinguishing two separable decisions in norm enforcement, first, punish or not, and second, how much to punish, with a third party punishment game. We find that ingroup favoritism only occurs when subjects decide
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Incentives are the essence of economics, and the question of how workers’ choices of effort and work hours respond to financial incentives is among the oldest questions in labor economics. Many efforts have already been devoted to understanding the
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Hangzhou experience attracts more and more attentions, as Hangzhou has explored a unique development path both in private sector and in public sector in the last decade. The main purpose of this article is to summarize the practices in public sectors
In this study, we examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the MPCR is held co
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::981431de173394e5c1c203affe064af0
http://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/sites/uoguelph.ca.economics/files/2011-10.pdf
http://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/sites/uoguelph.ca.economics/files/2011-10.pdf
Autor:
Liangcong Fan, Bin Xu
Publikováno v:
The 2nd International Conference on Information Science and Engineering.
The results of a number of laboratory experiments indicate that costly punishment can uphold cooperation in public goods game. However, studies also suggest that high cooperation does not necessarily imply high earning in experiments with punishment.