Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 25
pro vyhledávání: '"Levels structure"'
Publikováno v:
Álvarez-Mozos, M, van den Brink, R, van der Laan, G & Tejada, O 2017, ' From hierarchies to levels : new solutions for games with hierarchical structure ', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 1089-1113 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0572-z
International Journal of Game Theory, 46(4), 1089-1113. Springer Verlag
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
International Journal of Game Theory, 46(4), 1089-1113. Springer Verlag
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players’ pos
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::52ac93817d09d0591b7f276363586e26
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0572-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0572-z
Publikováno v:
ATM 2019, 13th USA/Europe Air Traffic Management Research and Development Seminar
ATM 2019, 13th USA/Europe Air Traffic Management Research and Development Seminar, Jun 2019, Vienne, Austria
ATM 2019, 13th USA/Europe Air Traffic Management Research and Development Seminar, Jun 2019, Vienne, Austria
International audience; We study separating urban unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) traffic into altitude levels, using a PBN-inspired approach in which low-density airspace has few layers while congested areas in the city center are split into a larger
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::deb0c0f0676c49b137899b025ed3e53e
https://hal-enac.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02178436
https://hal-enac.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02178436
Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
Economics Working Paper Series, 15/215
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Álvarez-Mozos, M, van den Brink, J R, van der Laan, G & Tejada, O 2015 ' From hierarchies to levels: new solutions for games with hierarchical structure ' TI Discussion Paper, no. 15-072/II, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam . < http://papers.tinbergen.nl/15072.pdf >
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Álvarez-Mozos, M, van den Brink, J R, van der Laan, G & Tejada, O 2015 ' From hierarchies to levels: new solutions for games with hierarchical structure ' TI Discussion Paper, no. 15-072/II, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam . < http://papers.tinbergen.nl/15072.pdf >
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players’ pos
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::839f49540045c563c41e2a64c241f310
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/109116
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/109116
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players’ pos
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::b369b00f8b7c42009feddcc44096348c
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/15072.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/15072.pdf
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players poss
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::c31ff35bcb46961d0de3d228d4765c17
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/111751
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/111751
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research, 224(1), 167-179. Elsevier
Alvarez-Mozos, M, van den Brink, J R, van der Laan, G & Tejada, O 2013, ' Share Functions for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation ', European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 224, no. 1, pp. 167-179 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.07.031
Alvarez-Mozos, M, van den Brink, J R, van der Laan, G & Tejada, O 2013, ' Share Functions for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation ', European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 224, no. 1, pp. 167-179 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.07.031
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'European Journal of Operational Research' , 2013, 224(1), 167-179. In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the fir
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d2691161e14ec446932d3e0d9409e468
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/12052.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/12052.pdf
Publikováno v:
Alvarez-Mozos, M, van den Brink, J R, van der Laan, G & Tejada, O 2012 ' Share Functions for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation ' TI Discussion Papers, no. 12-052/1, Tinbergen Institute/DSF, Amsterdam . < http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/12052.pdf >
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In such games the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::8200fe43be53631d655fdd966413c717
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/87223
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/87223
Akademický článek
Tento výsledek nelze pro nepřihlášené uživatele zobrazit.
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K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.
Akademický článek
Tento výsledek nelze pro nepřihlášené uživatele zobrazit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.