Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 64
pro vyhledávání: '"Leslie M. Marx"'
Autor:
Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 137:68-90
Autor:
Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Design. 26:385-415
Autor:
Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
Publikováno v:
The Antitrust Bulletin. 67:434-441
In vertical contracting models with complete information and linear prices, double markups that arise between independent firms provide an efficiency rationale for vertical mergers since these eliminate double markups (EDM). However, the double marku
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration
Autor:
Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review. 112:616-649
We provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets with multiple buyers and multiple suppliers. The market is modeled as a mechanism that maximizes the expected weighted wel
Autor:
Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Law and Economics. 64:705-744
Autor:
Leslie M. Marx, Simon Loertscher
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 120:1-15
Asset markets—institutions that reallocate goods among agents with heterogeneous endowments, demands, and valuations—abound in the real world but have received little attention in mechanism and market design. Assuming constant marginal, private v
Autor:
Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy. 127:2967-3017
We analyze the competitive effects of mergers in markets with buyer power. Using mechanism design arguments, we show that without cost synergies, mergers harm buyers, regardless of buyer power. How...
Autor:
Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
Publikováno v:
The Japanese Economic Review. 70:346-366
We consider the effects of a merger combined with a divestiture that mixes and matches the assets of the two pre-merger suppliers into one higher-cost and one lower-cost post-merger supplier. Such mix-and-match transactions leave the number of suppli
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 179:416-454
Previous literature has shown that private information is a transaction cost that prevents efficient reallocation in two-sided setups with bilateral trade or homogeneous goods. We derive conditions under which the impossibility of efficient trade ext
Autor:
Nathan Miller, Steven T. Berry, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Martin Gaynor, Richard Gilbert, George Alan Hay, Ginger Zhe Jin, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Francine Lafontaine, James A. Levinsohn, Leslie M. Marx, John W. Mayo, Aviv Nevo, Ariel Pakes, Nancy L. Rose, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Steven C. Salop, Marius Schwartz, Katja Seim, Carl Shapiro, Howard A. Shelanski, David S. Sibley, Andrew Sweeting
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.