Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 130
pro vyhledávání: '"Leme, Renato Paes"'
We study procurement auctions, where an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from strategic sellers with private costs. The quality of services is measured by a submodular function known to the auctioneer. Our goal is to design computationally effici
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.13513
Autor:
Aggarwal, Gagan, Badanidiyuru, Ashwinkumar, Balseiro, Santiago R., Bhawalkar, Kshipra, Deng, Yuan, Feng, Zhe, Goel, Gagan, Liaw, Christopher, Lu, Haihao, Mahdian, Mohammad, Mao, Jieming, Mehta, Aranyak, Mirrokni, Vahab, Leme, Renato Paes, Perlroth, Andres, Piliouras, Georgios, Schneider, Jon, Schvartzman, Ariel, Sivan, Balasubramanian, Spendlove, Kelly, Teng, Yifeng, Wang, Di, Zhang, Hanrui, Zhao, Mingfei, Zhu, Wennan, Zuo, Song
In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opportunities that have arisen as markets embrace this autobidding and co
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.07685
We introduce the notion of an online matroid embedding, which is an algorithm for mapping an unknown matroid that is revealed in an online fashion to a larger-but-known matroid. The existence of such embedding enables a reduction from the version of
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.10316
It has become the default in markets such as ad auctions for participants to bid in an auction through automated bidding agents (autobidders) which adjust bids over time to satisfy return-over-spend constraints. Despite the prominence of such systems
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.19350
Any social choice function (e.g the efficient allocation) can be implemented using different payment rules: first price, second price, all-pay, etc. All of these payment rules are guaranteed to have the same expected revenue by the revenue equivalenc
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04856
The success of Bayesian persuasion relies on the key assumption that the sender will commit to a predetermined information disclosure policy (signaling scheme). However, in practice, it is usually difficult for the receiver to monitor whether the sen
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.04973
We investigate auction mechanisms for AI-generated content, focusing on applications like ad creative generation. In our model, agents' preferences over stochastically generated content are encoded as large language models (LLMs). We propose an aucti
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.10826
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is robust against strategic manip
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.11967
We propose a model for learning with bandit feedback while accounting for deterministically evolving and unobservable states that we call Bandits with Deterministically Evolving States ($B$-$DES$). The workhorse applications of our model are learning
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.11655
We initiate the study of Bayesian conversations, which model interactive communication between two strategic agents without a mediator. We compare this to communication through a mediator and investigate the settings in which mediation can expand the
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.08827