Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 235
pro vyhledávání: '"LIU Shengxin"'
Publikováno v:
Cailiao gongcheng, Vol 52, Iss 3, Pp 137-148 (2024)
To analyze quantitatively various indexes of wire arc additive manufacturing components of 2319 aluminum alloy, the expressions of curved surface between different process parameters, porosity and tensile strength values were fitted, and the "process
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/0d13268297fc458a81cbcc03c39b248e
Publikováno v:
Dizhi lixue xuebao, Vol 30, Iss 4, Pp 563-578 (2024)
Objective Fracture network analysis plays an important role in oil and gas exploration and development. However, complexity analysis of tight sandstone fracture networks and their control factors is relatively lagging. Based on an experimental study
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/92ec1bdb35094036bb38ffa7f268e609
We study the problem of fairly allocating either a set of indivisible goods or a set of mixed divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods) to agents with additive utilities, taking the best-of-both-worlds perspective of guaranteeing fairness p
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.06877
$k$-plexes relax cliques by allowing each vertex to disconnect to at most $k$ vertices. Finding a maximum $k$-plex in a graph is a fundamental operator in graph mining and has been receiving significant attention from various domains. The state-of-th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.00617
We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this paper, we study
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.18133
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a combination of divisible and indivisible goods. While fairness criteria like envy-freeness (EF) and proportionality (PROP) can always be achieved for divisible goods, only their relaxed versions, such as
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.18132
We study the efficiency of fair allocations using the well-studied price of fairness concept, which quantitatively measures the worst-case efficiency loss when imposing fairness constraints. Previous works provided partial results on the price of fai
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.01516
We consider the fair allocation problem of indivisible items. Most previous work focuses on fairness and/or efficiency among agents given agents' preferences. However, besides the agents, the allocator as the resource owner may also be involved in ma
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.03475
The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of the resourc
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.00976
Publikováno v:
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), 80:1373-1406, 2024
Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and ar
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.09564