Zobrazeno 1 - 9
of 9
pro vyhledávání: '"Kurt R. Brekke"'
Two-part pricing (the Netflix model) has recently been proposed instead of uniform pricing for pharmaceuticals. Under two-part pricing the health plan pays a fixed fee for access to a drug at unit prices equal to marginal costs. Despite two-part pric
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4a8f171751abc8c2160ed0991d617259
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/77376
We study whether and how physicians respond to nancial incentives, making use of detailed register data on the health-care services provided to patients by general practitioners (GPs) in Norway over a six-year period (2006-11). To identify GPs' treat
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::09e864f28c223ac4f7691b5660ef9a59
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/35936
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/35936
This paper aims at shedding light on the social gradient by studying the relationship between socioeconomic status (SES) and provision of health care. Using administrative data on services provided by General Practitioners (GPs) in Norway over a fi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::373d63ce0dbf24c9dc60008117e54956
http://www.nipe.eeg.uminho.pt/Uploads/WP_2015/NIPE_WP_05_2015.pdf
http://www.nipe.eeg.uminho.pt/Uploads/WP_2015/NIPE_WP_05_2015.pdf
Publikováno v:
Developments in health economics and public policy. 12
Policymakers are increasingly designing policies that encourage patient choice and therefore mobility across providers. Since prices are regulated (fixed) in most countries, providers need to compete on quality to attract patients. This chapter revie
Using a spatial competition framework with three ex ante identical hospitals, we study the effects of a hospital merger on quality, price and welfare. The merging hospitals always reduce quality, but the non-merging hospital responds by reducing qual
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::cfc10f6cda5d52ae80ae68fe0e937583
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163406
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163406
Publikováno v:
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
instacron:RCAAP
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
instacron:RCAAP
We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effort when their budgets are soft, i.e., the payer may cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. The basic set up is a Hotelling model with two hospitals that differ in
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::31fa2b48c5fdc28cc239c0293fb1e496
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/18522
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/18522
In many markets, such as education, health care and public utilities, firms are often profit-constrained either due to regulation or because they have non-profit status. At the same time such firms might have altruistic concerns towards consumers. In
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::7759416d1bf00a42086be1bc808bc71a
We study the impact of product margins on pharmacies. incentive to promote generics instead of brand-names. First, we construct a theoretical model where phar-macies can persuade patients with a brand-name prescription to purchase a generic version i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::ecc60d09a3e929cfccf2bad5a5d51a0a
http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2010/NIPE_WP_20_2010.pdf
http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2010/NIPE_WP_20_2010.pdf
Autor:
Kurt R. Brekke, Odd Rune Straume
We analyse how a patent-holding pharmaceutical firm may strategically use advertising of existing drugs to affect R&D investments in new (differentiated) drugs, and thereby affect the probability distribution of future market structures in the indust
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::35eb66b1034721a59bff5903b7789178
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2433.pdf
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2433.pdf