Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 153
pro vyhledávání: '"Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 185:419-441
We study one-shot play in the set of all bimatrix games by a large population of agents. The agents never see the same game twice, but they can learn ‘across games’ by developing solution concepts that tell them how to play new games. Each agent
Publikováno v:
Babaei Khezerloo, E, Evstigneev, I & Schenk-Hoppe, K 2021, ' A multidimensional Fatou lemma for conditional expectations ', Positivity . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11117-021-00827-4
The classical multidimensional version of Fatou’s lemma (Schmeidler in Proc Am Math Soc 24:300–306, 1970) originally obtained for unconditional expectations and the standard non-negative cone in a finite-dimensional linear space is extended to co
Publikováno v:
Evstigneev, I, Hens, T, Potapova, V & Schenk-Hoppé, K R 2020, ' Behavioral equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics in asset markets ', Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 91, pp. 121-135 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.004
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Journal of Mathematical Economics
This paper analyzes a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of an asset market based on behavioral and evolutionary principles. The core of the model is a non-traditional game-theoretic framework combining elements of stochastic dynamic games and evol
Publikováno v:
Babaei, E, Evstigneev, I V, Schenk-hoppé, K R & Zhitlukhin, M 2020, ' Von Neumann-Gale Model, Market Frictions, and Capital Growth ', Stochastics . https://doi.org/10.1080/17442508.2020.1718152
The aim of this work is to extend the classical capital growth theory pertaining to frictionless nancial markets to models taking into account various kinds of frictions, including transaction costs and portfolio constraints. A natural generalization
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, National Academy of Sciences, 2021, 118 (26), pp.e2016514118. ⟨10.1073/pnas.2016514118⟩
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2021, 118 (26), pp.e2016514118. ⟨10.1073/pnas.2016514118⟩
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, National Academy of Sciences, 2021, 118 (26), pp.e2016514118. ⟨10.1073/pnas.2016514118⟩
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2021, 118 (26), pp.e2016514118. ⟨10.1073/pnas.2016514118⟩
International audience; The paper models evolution in pecunia—in the realm of finance. Financial markets are explored as evolving biological systems. Diverse investment strategies compete for the market capital invested in long-lived dividend-payin
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The paper models evolution in pecunia—in the realm of finance. Financial markets are explored as evolving biological systems. Investors pursuing diverse investment strategies compete for the market capital. Some `survive' and some `become extinct.'
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper analyzes a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of an asset market based on behavioral and evolutionary principles. The core of the model is a non-traditional game-theoretic framework combining elements of stochastic dynamic games and evol